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Abstract
We develop a model in which nancially constrained arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies
across segmented markets. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage capital are self-correcting:
following a shock that depletes capital, returns increase, and this allows capital to be grad-
ually replenished. Spreads increase more for trades with volatile fundamentals or more time
to convergence. Arbitrageurs cut their positions more in those trades, except when volatility
concerns the hedgeable component. Financial constraints yield a positive cross-sectional rela-
tionship between spreads/returns and betas with respect to arbitrage capital. Diversication of
arbitrageurs across markets induces contagion, but generally lowers arbitrageurs' risk and price
volatility.
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1 Introduction
The assumption of frictionless arbitrage is central to nance theory and all of its practical ap-
plications. It is hard to reconcile, however, with the large body of evidence on so called market
anomalies, notably those concerning price discrepancies between assets with almost identical pay-
os. Such discrepancies arise in a variety of markets, during both crises and more tranquil times.
For example, large and persistent violations of covered interest parity have been documented for
all major currency pairs, both during and after the global nancial crisis. Price discrepancies that
are hard to reconcile with frictionless arbitrage have also been documented for stocks, government
bonds, corporate bonds, and credit default swaps.1
One approach to address the anomalies has been to abandon the assumption of frictionless
arbitrage and study the constraints faced by real-world arbitrageurs, e.g., hedge funds or trading
desks in investment banks. Arbitrageurs have limited capital, and this can constrain their activity
and ultimately aect market liquidity and asset prices. Empirical studies have constructed various
measures of arbitrage capital and shown them to be related to the magnitude of the anomalies.
Since arbitrage capital can be targeted at multiple anomalies, the returns to investing in the
anomalies are interdependent and so are arbitrageurs' positions. In this paper we develop a model
to address a number of questions that this interdependence raises. How should arbitrageurs allo-
cate their limited capital across anomalies, and how should this allocation respond to shocks to
capital? Which anomalies' returns are more sensitive to changes in arbitrage capital? How do the
expected returns oered by the dierent anomalies relate to sensitivity to arbitrage capital and
other characteristics? How do the expected returns oered by anomalies evolve over time, and how
do these dynamics relate to those of arbitrage capital?
We consider a discrete-time, innite-horizon economy, with a riskless asset and a number of
\arbitrage opportunities" (the anomalies within our model) each consisting of a pair of risky assets
with correlated payos. Each risky asset is traded in a dierent segmented market by risk-averse
investors who can trade only that asset and the riskless asset. Investors experience endowment
shocks that generate a hedging demand for the risky asset in their market. Shocks are opposites
within each pair, so a positive hedging demand for one asset in the pair is associated with a
negative hedging demand of equal magnitude for the other. This simplifying assumption ensures
that arbitrageurs trade only on the price discrepancy between the two assets. Market segmentation
is exogenous in our model, but could arise because of regulation, agency problems, or lack of
specialized knowledge.
1References to the empirical literature are in Sections 2.2.3 and 4.3.2. In these sections we also explain how to
map our model and results to the empirical settings.
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We make two key assumptions. First, unlike other investors, arbitrageurs can trade all as-
sets. Thus, they have better opportunities than other investors. By exploiting price discrepancies
between paired assets, they intermediate trade between otherwise segmented investors, providing
them with liquidity: they buy cheap assets from investors with negative hedging demand, and sell
expensive assets to investors with positive hedging demand. We term the price discrepancies that
arbitrageurs seek to exploit \arbitrage spreads" and use them as an inverse measure of liquidity.
Second, we assume that arbitrageurs are constrained in their access to external capital. We
derive their nancial constraint following the logic of market segmentation and assuming that they
can walk away from their liabilities unless these are backed by collateral. Consider an arbitrageur
wishing to buy an asset and short the other asset in its pair. The arbitrageur could borrow the
cash required to buy the former asset, but the loan must be backed by collateral. Posting the asset
as collateral would leave the lender exposed to a decline in its value. The arbitrageur could post
as additional collateral the short position in the other asset, which can oset declines in the value
of the long position. Market segmentation, however, prevents investors other than arbitrageurs
from dealing in multiple risky assets. Hence, the additional collateral must be a riskless asset
position. We assume that collateral must be sucient to protect the lender fully against default.
This implies, in particular, that positions in assets with more volatile payos require more collateral
so that lenders are protected against larger losses. The need for collateral limits the positions that
an arbitrageur can establish, and that constraint is a function of his wealth. The positions that
arbitrageurs can establish as a group are constrained by their aggregate wealth, which we also refer
to as arbitrage capital.
When assets in each pair have identical payos, arbitrage is riskless. This case is a natural
benchmark, and we analyze it rst. If spreads are positive, then the riskless return oered by
arbitrage opportunities exceeds the riskless rate. Arbitrageurs, however, may not be able to scale
up their positions to exploit that return because of their nancial constraint. Their optimal policy
is to invest in the opportunities that oer maximum return per unit of collateral. Equilibrium is
characterized by a cuto return per unit of collateral: arbitrageurs invest in the opportunities above
the cuto, driving their return down to the cuto, and do not invest in opportunities below the
cuto. The cuto is inversely related to arbitrage capital. When, for example, capital increases,
arbitrageurs become less constrained and can hold larger positions. This drives down the returns
of the opportunities they invest in.
The inverse relationship between returns and capital implies self-correcting dynamics and a
deterministic steady state. If arbitrage capital is low, then arbitrageurs hold small positions,
returns are high, and capital gradually increases. Conversely, if capital is high, then returns are
low and capital decreases because of arbitrageurs' consumption. In steady state, arbitrage remains
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protable enough to oset the natural depletion of capital due to consumption.
We next analyze the case where payos within each asset pair consist of a component that is
identical across the two assets and hedgeable by arbitrageurs, and a component that diers. Because
asset payos are not identical, arbitrage is risky. As in the riskless-arbitrage case, arbitrageurs invest
in the opportunities that oer maximum return per unit of collateral. Unlike in that case, however,
the relevant return is the expected return net of a risk adjustment that depends on arbitrageur risk
aversion and position size. The nancial constraint binds when the risk-adjusted return exceeds
the riskless rate.
To compute the equilibrium under risky arbitrage in closed form, we specialize our analysis to
the case were asset payos are near-identical and hence arbitrage risk is small. In the stochastic
steady state, the nancial constraint always binds and arbitrage capital follows an approximate
AR(1) process. Moreover, the rst-order eect of arbitrage risk on equilibrium variables operates
through the nancial constraint rather than through risk aversion. Indeed, price movements caused
by shocks to arbitrage capital represent an additional source of risk for a collateralized position.
The required collateral must then increase by an amount proportional to the standard deviation of
these movements. On the other hand, the risk adjustment induced by risk aversion is proportional
to the variance because it is an expectation of gains and losses weighted by marginal utility.
Using our closed-form solutions, we can determine the cross-section of expected returns and
arbitrageur positions. We show that expected returns are high for arbitrage opportunities involving
assets with volatile payos because these opportunities require more collateral. They are also high
for \long-horizon" opportunities, i.e., opportunities for which price discrepancies take longer to
disappear because endowment shocks have longer duration. Indeed, because spreads for these
opportunities are more sensitive to shocks to arbitrageur wealth, the losses that arbitrageurs can
incur are larger, implying higher collateral requirements.
The characteristics associated with high expected returns are also associated with high sensi-
tivity of spreads to arbitrage capital, i.e., high \arbitrage-capital betas." Since opportunities with
volatile payos require more collateral, they must oer high expected returns. Since, in addition,
changes in capital impact the return per unit of collateral, arbitrage-capital betas for the same
opportunities are high. In the case of long-horizon opportunities, the causal channel is dierent:
high arbitrage-capital betas result in high collateral requirements, which in turn result in high
expected returns. Our results are consistent with the relationship between expected returns or
spreads on one hand and arbitrage-capital betas on the other being increasing in the cross-section,
as documented in Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2016) in the context of covered-interest arbitrage
and Cho (2016) in the context of stock-market anomalies.
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The cross-section of arbitrageur positions diers from that of expected returns. Arbitrageurs
hold larger positions in opportunities where the hedgeable component of payo volatility is larger,
but smaller positions in opportunities where the unhedgeable component is larger or where horizon
is longer. Intuitively, volatility has two countervailing eects on arbitrageur positions: it lowers
them because it raises collateral requirements, but it raises them because it raises investors' hedging
demand and need for intermediation. The eect of each component of volatility on collateral
requirements is proportional to its standard deviation, while that on hedging demand is proportional
to its variance. The former is larger in the case of small unhedgeable volatility, i.e., small arbitrage
risk. The eect of volatility on the dynamics of positions parallels that on average positions.
Following drops to arbitrage capital, positions in opportunities with higher unhedgeable volatility
are cut by more, while positions in opportunities with higher hedgeable volatility are cut by less.
We nally use our model to study how the degree of mobility of arbitrage capital aects market
stability: does capital mobility stabilize markets, or does it propagate shocks causing contagion
and instability? To do so, we consider the possibility that any given arbitrageur can allocate his
wealth to exploit only one opportunity. That is, arbitrage markets themselves are segmented so
that arbitrage capital cannot be reallocated from one opportunity to another. For simplicity we
take opportunities to be symmetric with independent payos. If an arbitrageur can diversify across
opportunities but others remain undiversied, then the variance of his wealth decreases because
spreads are independent. If instead all arbitrageurs can diversify, then spreads become perfectly
correlated, as arbitrageurs act as conduits transmitting shocks in one market to all markets|a
contagion eect. We show, however, that because collective diversication causes the variance
of each spread to decrease, the variance of each arbitrageur's wealth decreases. In fact, collective
diversication lowers wealth variance by as much as individual diversication. In that sense, capital
mobility stabilizes markets.
Our paper belongs to a growing theoretical literature on the limits of arbitrage, and more
precisely to its strand emphasizing arbitrageurs' nancial constraints.2 We contribute to that
literature by deriving the cross section and dynamics of arbitrageur returns and positions in a
setting where arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assets with similar payos.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) are the rst to derive a two-way relationship between arbitrage
capital and asset prices. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) introduce some of our model's building blocks:
arbitrageurs intermediate trade across segmented markets, and are subject to a collateral-based
nancial constraint. They assume, however, a single arbitrage opportunity and a nite horizon.
These assumptions rule out, respectively, cross-sectional eects and self-correcting dynamics.
Our result that arbitrage opportunities with higher collateral requirements oer higher returns
2For a survey of this literature, see Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
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is related to a number of papers. In Geanakoplos (2003), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), and
Brumm, Grill, Kubler, and Schmedders (2015), multiple risky assets dier in their collateral value,
i.e., the amount that agents can borrow using the asset as collateral. Assets with low collateral
value must oer higher expected returns, and violations of the law of one price can arise.3 These
violations, however, are dierent in nature from those in our model: we assume that both assets
in a pair have the same collateral value but dier in investors' hedging demand. Empirical studies
conrm that hedging demand (or more generally demand unrelated to collateral value) is a key
driver of arbitrage spreads.4
In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), collateral-constrained arbitrageurs invest in assets with
maximum return per unit of collateral. Since volatile assets require more collateral, their returns
are higher and more sensitive to changes in arbitrage capital. In that paper, however, there is no
segmentation and the law of one price holds. Moreover, the analysis does not address dynamic
issues such as the eect of horizon or the recovery from shocks.
Our results on self-correcting dynamics are related to several papers. In Due and Strulovici
(2012), capital recovers following adverse shocks because new capital enters the market. In Xiong
(2001), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), recovery instead
occurs because existing capital grows faster|the same channel as in our model. In these papers,
however, arbitrageurs invest in a single risky asset. This rules out cross-sectional eects and
violations of the law of one price.5
Finally, our analysis of integration versus segmentation relates to Wagner (2011), who shows
that investors choose not to hold the same diversied portfolio because this exposes them to the
risk that they all liquidate at the same time, and to Guembel and Sussman (2015) and Caballero
and Simsek (2017), who show that segmentation generally raises volatility and reduces investor
welfare. Contagion eects resulting from changes in arbitrageur capital or portfolio constraints are
also derived in, e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Pavlova and Rigobon (2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives
the equilibrium when arbitrage is riskless because assets in each pair have identical payos. Section
4 analyzes risky arbitrage, and derives the cross-sectional properties of prices and positions, as well
as the eects of capital mobility. Section 5 concludes, and proofs are in the Appendix.
3Detemple and Murthy (1997), Basak and Croitoru (2000, 2006), and Chabakauri (2013) derive related results for
more general portfolio constraints.
4See, for example, the literature on covered interest arbitrage, summarized in Section 2.2.3.
5Kondor and Vayanos (2016) derive self-correcting dynamics in a setting where arbitrageurs can invest in multiple
risky assets. Arbitrageurs in their setting, however, do not intermediate trades because there is no segmentation, and
the law of one price holds. Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2015) assume gradual rebalancing of arbitrageur portfolios
across markets, in the spirit of Due (2010) and Due and Strulovici (2012), and allow for multiple risky assets
within each market. Arbitrageurs in their setting, however, face no nancial constraints.
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2 The Model
2.1 Assets
There is an innite number of discrete periods indexed by t 2 N. There is one riskless asset with
exogenous return r > 0. There is also a continuum I of innitely lived risky assets, all in zero
supply. Risky assets come in pairs. Asset i's payo per share in period t is
di;t  di + i;t + i;t; (1)
where di is a positive constant, and i;t and i;t are random variables distributed symmetrically
around zero in the respective intervals [ i; i] and [ i; i]. The other asset in i's pair is denoted
by  i and its payo per share in period t is
d i;t  di + i;t   i;t: (2)
If i = 0, then assets i and  i have identical payos, and a trade consisting of an one-share long
position in one asset and an one-share short position in the other involves no risk. If instead i > 0,
then payos are not identical and the long-short trade is risky. In both cases, we refer to asset pair
(i; i) as an arbitrage opportunity. This corresponds to textbook arbitrage when i = 0 and the
two assets trade at dierent prices.
We assume that the variables
i;t
i
are i.i.d. across time and identically distributed across asset
pairs (but correlation across pairs is possible). We make the same assumption for the variables
i;t
i
,
which we also assume independent of
i;t
i
. Because distributions are identical across asset pairs, i
and i are proportional to the standard deviations of i;t and i;t, respectively, and we refer to them
as volatilities. We restrict di to be larger than i + i so that asset payos are non-negative. We
denote by pi;t the ex-dividend price of asset i in period t, and dene the asset's price discount by
i;t  di
r
  pi;t; (3)
i.e., the present value of expected future payos discounted at the riskless rate r, minus the price.
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2.2 Outside Investors
2.2.1 Market Segmentation
For some agents, who we term outside investors, the markets for the risky assets are segmented.
Each outside investor can invest in only two assets: the riskless asset and one specic risky asset.
We refer to the outside investors who can invest in risky asset i as i-investors. We assume that
i-investors are competitive and innitely lived, form a continuum with measure i, consume in each
period, and have negative exponential utility
 Et
" 1X
s=t+1
s t exp ( ci;s)
#
; (4)
where  is the coecient of absolute risk aversion and  is the subjective discount factor. In period
t, an i-investor chooses positions fyi;sgst in asset i and consumption fci;sgst+1 to maximize (4)
subject to a budget constraint. We denote the investor's wealth in period t by wi;t. We study
optimization in period t after consumption ci;t has been chosen, which is why we optimize over
ci;s for s  t + 1. Accordingly, we dene wi;t as the wealth net of ci;t. We assume that i- and
 i-investors are identical in terms of their measure, i.e., i =  i. Negative exponential utility
of outside investors simplies our analysis because it ensures that their demand for risky assets is
independent of their wealth. The only wealth eects in our model concern the arbitrageurs.
2.2.2 Endowment Shocks
Outside investors receive random endowments, which aect their appetite for risky assets. In period
t each i-investor receives an endowment equal to
ui;t 1(i;t + i;t); (5)
where ui;t 1 is known in period t  1. We assume that ui;t is equal to zero, except over a sequence
ofMi periods t 2 fhi Mi; ::; hi 1g during which it can become equal to a constant ui. When this
occurs, we say that i-investors experience an endowment shock of intensity ui and duration Mi.
An endowment shock in market i is accompanied by one in market  i. If the shocks were
identical, then assets i and  i would be trading at the same price in the absence of arbitrageurs
because of symmetry. To ensure a dierence in prices and hence a role for arbitrageurs, we assume
that endowment shocks dier. We further restrict the shocks to be opposites, i.e., ui =  u i.
This assumption, together with that of zero supply, ensures that the price discounts of assets i and
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 i are opposites in equilibrium. With opposite price discounts, arbitrageurs (described in Section
2.3) nd it optimal to hold opposite positions in the two assets, hence trading only on the price
discrepancy between them. This simplies the equilibrium because arbitrageurs are not exposed to
the shock i;t, and hence earn a riskless return when assets i and  i have identical payos.
Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies, and in doing so they intermediate trade between in-
vestors and provide liquidity to them. Suppose, for example, that i-investors experience a shock
ui > 0. Their endowment then becomes positively correlated with i;t + i;t and hence with asset
i's payo. As a consequence, asset i becomes less attractive to them. Conversely, asset  i becomes
more attractive to  i-investors, who experience a shock u i < 0. In the absence of arbitrageurs,
the equilibrium price of asset i would decrease and that of asset  i would increase. Arbitrageurs
can exploit this price discrepancy by buying asset i from i-investors and selling asset  i to  i-
investors. In doing so, they intermediate trade between the two sets of investors, which market
segmentation prevents otherwise. Because of arbitrageurs, prices are less sensitive to endowment
shocks and price discrepancies are smaller.6
When investors i and  i experience endowment shocks, we say that arbitrage opportunity (i; i)
is active. We identify active opportunities with the assets with the positive endowment shocks: we
set
At  fi 2 I : ui;t > 0g ;
and refer to active opportunity (i; i) for i 2 At as opportunity i. We assume that the set At
of active opportunities is nite. We also assume that the probability of an opportunity becoming
active (an event that may occur in period hi  Mi for opportunity i) is arbitrarily small. This is
consistent with opportunities forming a continuum and a nite number being active in each period.
This also ensures that endowment shocks do not aect prices until they actually hit investors.
6If endowment shocks for i- and  i-investors were not opposites, then arbitrageurs would not hold opposite
positions in assets i and  i. They would still intermediate trade between investors, however, if they are suciently
risk averse. Suppose, for example, that i-investors experience a shock ui > 0 but  i-investors do not, i.e., u i = 0.
Arbitrageurs would buy asset i from i-investors to benet from its positive price discount. If they are suciently risk
averse, they would hedge that position by selling asset  i to  i-investors, hence intermediating trade between i- and
 i-investors. Because buying asset i yields a higher expected excess return than selling asset  i, arbitrageurs would
choose not to be fully hedged, and hence would be exposed to the risk that i;t is low.
If assets i and  i were in positive rather than in zero supply, then arbitrageurs would hold a larger long position
in asset i and would be more exposed to the risk that i;t is low. If assets without endowment shocks were also
in positive supply then they would trade at a positive price discount but one that would be smaller than asset i's.
Because positions in the no-endowment-shock assets require a comparable level of collateral as in assets i and  i but
earn a lower expected return, arbitrageurs would not trade those assets if their wealth were small enough.
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2.2.3 Interpretation
Our assumptions t settings where assets with similar payos trade in partially segmented markets.
These include Siamese-twin stocks, covered interest arbitrage across currencies, government bonds,
corporate bonds, and credit-default swaps (CDS).
Siamese-twin stocks have identical dividend streams but dier in the country where most of
their trading occurs. Rosenthal and Young (1990) nd that price dierences between Siamese
twins can be signicant. Dabora and Froot (1999) show that a stock tends to appreciate relative to
its Siamese twin when the aggregate stock market in the country where that stock is mostly traded
goes up. They argue that one reason why Siamese-twin stocks dier in their main trading venue
is that each stock belongs to a dierent country's main stock index. Thus, index funds in each
country can only invest in one of the stocks. Index funds in that setting correspond to our model's
outside investors, ows in or out of these funds correspond to our model's endowment shocks, and
market segmentation arises from restricted fund mandates (which are possibly a response to agency
problems).
Covered interest arbitrage exploits violations of covered interest parity (CIP), the relationship
implied by absence of arbitrage between the spot and forward exchange rates for a currency pair
and the interest rates on the two currencies. Violations of CIP can be measured by the cross-
currency basis (CCB). Taking one of the currencies to be the dollar, the CCB is the dierence
between the dollar interest rate minus its CIP-implied value. A negative CCB indicates that the
dollar is cheaper in the forward market than its CIP-implied value.
Violations of CIP have been small from 2000 until the global nancial crisis, but have become
large both during and after the crisis. Explanations of CIP violations during the crisis have fo-
cused on increased counterparty risk and diculty to borrow in dollars.7 These factors, however,
have subsided after the crisis, and explanations of CIP violations since then have instead focused
on hedging pressure in the forward market combined with nancially constrained arbitrage. Bo-
rio, McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2016) construct measures of the hedging demand of banks,
institutional investors (such as pension funds and insurance companies), and non-nancial rms.
Consistent with the hedging pressure explanation, they nd that a negative CCB is more likely
when these institutions seek to hedge against a drop in the dollar. Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan
(2016) argue that the demand for hedging against a drop in the dollar should be high for currencies
with low interest rates relative to the dollar, and nd that a negative CCB is indeed more likely
for those currencies. They also relate the CCB to measures of arbitrageurs' nancial constraints.8
7See, for example, Baba and Packer (2009), Coey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009), and Mancini Grioli and Ranaldo
(2012).
8Other related work on CIP violations after the crisis includes Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2016), Iida, Kimura,
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Our model can be applied to covered interest arbitrage by interpreting the two assets in a
pair as a currency forward and its synthetic counterpart. Outside investors in the forward market
are the hedgers that Borio, McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2016) consider: these agents may
lack the specialized knowledge or trading infrastructure to access synthetic forwards. Likewise,
outside investors in the synthetic forward market may be prevented from trading forwards because
of restricted mandates.9
Bonds with similar coupon rates and times to maturity can trade at signicantly dierent
yields. Fontaine and Garcia (2012) and Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) aggregate such deviations
across the nominal term structure by tting it to a smooth curve. They nd that the t worsens
when arbitrageurs' nancial constraints tighten, e.g., during nancial crises or when the leverage
of shadow banks decreases. In that context, outside investors can represent investors who must
hold bonds with specic coupon rates and times to maturity. Such investors might be insurance
companies or pension funds, and their preferences could be driven by asset-liability management
or tax considerations.
Fleckenstein, Longsta, and Lustig (2014) nd that nominal government bonds tend to be
signicantly more expensive than their synthetic counterparts formed by ination-indexed bonds,
ination swaps, and zero-coupon bonds. Moreover, price discrepancies become larger when arbi-
trage capital, measured by hedge-fund assets, is depleted. The additional nding that nominal and
ination-indexed bonds are owned by dierent types of institutions suggests a degree of market
segmentation.
Due (2010) documents price discrepancies between corporate bonds and matched CDS. These
discrepancies became particularly large during the global nancial crisis, but remained signicant
afterwards. One driver of market segmentation in that setting is that individual investors can trade
corporate bonds but not CDS.
2.3 Arbitrageurs
2.3.1 Better Investment Opportunities
Arbitrageurs can invest in all risky assets and in the riskless asset. Hence, only they can overcome
market segmentation. We assume that they are competitive and innitely lived, form a continuum
and Sudo (2016), Liao (2016), and Sushko, Borio, McCauley, and McGuire (2016).
9Consider, for example, US non-nancial rms that issue debt in euros to benet from lower credit spreads in the
euro area relative to the US (Borio, McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko (2016)). Those rms seek to hedge against a
drop in the dollar as they earn most of their prots in dollars but must pay euro-denominated debt. They can hedge
in the forward market, but trading synthetic forwards may be too complicated or impossible for them: in particular,
they would have to borrow dollars without paying a credit spread. Conversely, bond mutual funds can invest in euro-
or dollar-denominated bonds but may be prevented by their mandates from trading currency forwards. Liao (2016)
links CIP violations to the hedging demand of non-nancial rms using a segmented-markets model.
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with measure one, consume in each period, and have logarithmic utility
Et
" 1X
s=t+1
s t log (cs)
#
; (6)
where  is the subjective discount factor.10 In period t, an arbitrageur chooses positions fxi;sgi2I;st
in all risky assets and consumption fcsgst+1 to maximize (6). The arbitrageur is subject to a
nancial constraint (see section 2.3.2) and a budget constraint. We denote the arbitrageur's wealth
in period t by Wt and assume that W0 > 0. Since arbitrageurs have measure one, Wt is also their
aggregate wealth, which we also refer to as arbitrage capital. Logarithmic utility of arbitrageurs
simplies our analysis because it ensures that their consumption is a constant fraction of their
wealth.
2.3.2 Financial Constraint
We assume that agents must collateralize their asset positions. Consider an agent who wants to
establish a long position in a risky asset. If the agent needs to borrow cash to buy the asset,
then he must post collateral to commit to repay the cash loan. Consider next an agent who wants
to establish a short position in a risky asset. The agent must borrow the asset so that he can
sell it subsequently, and must post collateral to commit to return the asset. We assume that i-
investors have enough wealth to collateralize any position they may want to establish, i.e., up to
iui. Arbitrageurs, however, may be constrained by their wealth.
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Standard asset pricing models assume that agents can establish any combination of asset posi-
tions provided they have sucient wealth to cover any liabilities that their positions generate. One
interpretation of this constraint is that a central clearinghouse registers all positions and prevents
agents from undertaking liabilities that they cannot cover. The constraint is formally equivalent
to requiring wealth to be always non-negative, and is thus redundant for agents with logarithmic
utility.
We assume that arbitrageurs are subject to a stronger constraint. We require them to have
sucient wealth in each market to cover any liabilities that their positions in that market generate.
10By xing the measure of arbitrageurs, we are ruling out entry and are focusing the evolution of the wealth of
existing arbitrageurs as the driver of price dynamics. Due and Strulovici (2012) study how entry impeded by search
frictions aects price dynamics. Their analysis provides a complementary perspective to ours. Note that the duration
Mi of endowment shocks can be interpreted as the time it takes for enough new arbitrageurs to enter the market for
arbitrage opportunity (i; i) and eliminate that opportunity.
11Our assumption that outside investors are unconstrained does not necessarily imply that they are wealthier
than arbitrageurs because their positions could be smaller. This could be the case for two distinct reasons. First,
the position that arbitrageurs as a group establish in asset i is the opposite to that of i-investors. Therefore, if
arbitrageurs are in smaller measure than i-investors, then they hold a larger position per capita in asset i. Second,
each arbitrageur can trade more risky assets than each outside investor, leading to a larger aggregate position.
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The positions of arbitrageurs in market i consist of a position in asset i and a position in the
riskless asset. We require this combined position to always have non-negative value. Thus, liability
is calculated market-by-market rather than by aggregating across all markets. This is in the spirit
of market segmentation: the same informational or regulatory frictions that prevent i-investors for
investing in risky assets other than asset i could also be preventing arbitrageurs' lenders in market
i from accepting such assets as collateral.12
To derive the nancial constraint of an arbitrageur, we denote by xi;t his position in asset i, by
z0i;t his investment in the riskless asset held in market i, and by zi;t = xi;tpi;t + z
0
i;t the value of his
combined position in market i, all in period t. The value of the arbitrageur's combined position in
market i in period t+ 1 is
zi;t+1 = z
0
i;t(1 + r) + xi;t [di;t+1 + pi;t+1]
= zi;t(1 + r) + xi;t [di;t+1 + pi;t+1   (1 + r)pi;t] (7)
and must be non-negative. Requiring (7) to be non-negative for all possible realizations of uncer-
tainty in period t+ 1 yields
zi;t  maxfj;t+1;j;t+1gj2I

xi;t

pi;t   di;t+1 + pi;t+1
1 + r

: (8)
The right-hand side of (8) represents the maximum loss, in present-value terms, that the arbitrageur
can realize in market i between periods t and t + 1. This loss must be smaller than the value of
the arbitrageur's combined position in market i in period t. Thus, the arbitrageur can nance a
long position in asset i by borrowing cash with the asset as collateral, but must contribute enough
cash of his own to cover against the most extreme price decline. Conversely, the arbitrageur can
borrow and short-sell asset i using the cash proceeds as collateral for the loan, but must contribute
enough cash of his own to cover against the most extreme price increase.
Aggregating (8) across markets yields the nancial constraint
Wt =
X
i2I
zi;t 
X
i2I
max
fj;t+1;j;t+1gj2I

xi;t

pi;t   di;t+1 + pi;t+1
1 + r

(9)
12Using one asset as collateral for a position in the other is known as cross-netting. One situation where cross-
netting is generally not possible is when one asset is traded over-the-counter and the other in an exchange, e.g., US
bonds are traded over the counter and US bond futures in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. For a more detailed
description of the frictions that hamper cross-netting see, for example, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Shen, Yan,
and Zhang (2014). While our model rules out cross-netting, it can be generalized to allow for partial cross-netting.
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since the value of the arbitrageur's positions summed across markets is his wealth Wt. The con-
straint (9) requires the arbitrageur to have enough wealth to cover his maximum loss in each market
separately.13
Our formulation of the nancial constraint assumes that the only assets that arbitrageurs can
trade with i-investors, or use as collateral in market i, are asset i and the riskless asset. Under a more
general formulation, arbitrageurs could trade with i-investors any contracts that are contingent on
future uncertainty. These contracts could be collateralized by the riskless asset, by asset i, or by any
other contracts traded in market i. Moreover, contracts could extend over any number of periods.
In Appendix B we formulate equilibrium in our model under such general contracts. The only
restrictions that we are maintaining are that i-investors cannot contract directly with j-investors
for j 6= i (only indirectly through arbitrageurs), and that arbitrageurs cannot use contracts traded
with j-investors as collateral for contracts traded with i-investors. These restrictions are consistent
with the logic of market segmentation.
We show in Appendix B that without loss of generality, contracts can be assumed to be fully
collateralized and hence default-free. Moreover, when assets in each pair have identical payos
(i = 0) and distributions are binomial (i;t binomial), contracts can be restricted to those studied
in this section: only asset i and the riskless asset are traded and used as collateral in market i.
This generalizes, within our setting, the no-default result of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), shown
under the assumption that contracts extend over one period.14 Thus, the nancial constraint (9)
can be derived under general contracts that are consistent with market segmentation.
2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
We look for a competitive equilibrium that is symmetric in the sense that price discounts and
agents' positions are opposites for the assets in each pair.
Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium consists of prices pi;t and positions in the risky assets yi;t
for the i-investors and xi;t for the arbitrageurs, such that positions are optimal given prices and the
markets for all risky assets clear:
iyi;t + xi;t = 0: (10)
13The constraint (9) can extend to a continuous-time limit of our model if that limit involves jumps. With jumps,
the support of fj;t+1; j;t+1gj2I does not converge to zero and neither does the maximum loss in period t + 1. If
instead the support of fj;t+1; j;t+1gj2I converges to zero, as it would in a Brownian limit, then the maximum loss
converges to zero and (9) is always met. For a derivation of a nancial constraint in a continuous-time limit with
jumps, see Chabakauri and Han (2017).
14Besides allowing for dynamic contracts, we allow a contract to serve as collateral for other contracts, in a recursive
manner. A similar recursive construction is in Gottardi and Kubler (2015). Simsek (2013) characterizes default rates
in collateral equilibrium for general distributions in a static setting. For more references on leverage and collateral
equilibrium, see the survey by Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015).
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Denition 2. A competitive equilibrium is symmetric if for the assets (i; i) in each pair the
price discounts are opposites (i;t =   i;t), the positions of outside investors are opposites (yi;t =
 y i;t), and so are the positions of arbitrageurs (xi;t =  x i;t).
Symmetry implies that the price discount of each asset is one-half of the dierence between its
price and the price of the other asset:
i;t =
pi;t   p i;t
2
:
Since the price discount measures the price dierence between paired assets, we also refer to it as
the spread. The spread is an inverse measure of the liquidity that arbitrageurs provide to outside
investors.
2.5 Optimization Problems
2.5.1 Outside Investors
The budget constraint of an i-investor is
wi;t+1 = yi;t(di;t+1 + pi;t+1) + (1 + r)(wi;t   yi;tpi;t) + ui;t(i;t+1 + i;t+1)  ci;t+1: (11)
The investor holds yi;t shares of asset i in period t, and these shares are worth yi;t(di;t+1+pi;t+1) in
period t+1. The investor also holds wi;t  yi;tpi;t units of the riskless asset in period t, i.e., wealth
wi;t minus the investment yi;tpi;t in asset i. This investment is worth (1+ r)(wi;t yi;tpi;t) in period
t+1. Finally, the random endowment ui;t(i;t+1+i;t+1) is added to the investor's wealth in period
t+ 1, while consumption ci;t+1 lowers wealth.
We can simplify (11) by introducing the return per share of asset i in excess of the riskless asset.
This excess return is
Ri;t+1  di;t+1 + pi;t+1   (1 + r)pi;t
= (1 + r)i;t   i;t+1 + i;t+1 + i;t+1; (12)
where the second step follows from (1) and (3). The expected excess return of asset i is
i;t  Et (Ri;t+1) = (1 + r)i;t   Et (i;t+1) : (13)
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Using (12) and (13), we can write (11) as
wi;t+1 = (1+ r)wi;t+ yi;ti;t+(yi;t+ui;t)(i;t+1+ i;t+1)+ yi;t [Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1]  ci;t+1: (14)
The investor's wealth in period t+1 is uncertain as of period t because of the payo shock i;t+1+
i;t+1 and the price discount i;t+1. The investor's exposure to the payo shock is the sum of her
asset position yi;t and endowment shock ui;t, while her exposure to the price discount is yi;t.
We conjecture that the investor's value function in period t is
Vi;t(wi;t) =   exp ( Awi;t   Fi;t) ; (15)
where Fi;t is a possibly stochastic function and A is a constant. The value function is negative
exponential in wealth because the utility function depends on consumption in the same manner.
2.5.2 Arbitrageurs
The budget constraint of an arbitrageur is
Wt+1 =
X
i2I
xi;t(di;t+1 + pi;t+1) + (1 + r)
 
Wt  
X
i2I
xi;tpi;t
!
  ct+1: (16)
The dierences with the budget constraint (11) of an i-investor are that the arbitrageur can invest
in all assets and receives no endowment. We next simplify the budget constraint (16) and the
nancial constraint (9) by using properties of a symmetric equilibrium.
A rst simplifying property is that i;t = 0 for assets that are not part of active opportunities.
This property holds in equilibrium, as we explain here and show formally in Sections 3 and 4. An
implication of this property is that Et(i;t+1) = i;t = 0 since the probability of an opportunity
becoming active is arbitrarily small. Since i;t = 0, investing in assets that are not part of active
opportunities exposes arbitrageurs to risk that is not compensated in terms of expected excess re-
turn. Investing in those assets also tightens the nancial constraint (9). Hence, the optimal position
is zero. Outside investors' optimal position is also zero because they have a zero endowment and
hence would hold a non-zero position only if the expected excess return were non-zero. Therefore,
the markets for assets that are not part of active opportunities clear with a zero price discount,
conrming our conjecture that i;t = 0. Using that property as well as (12), (13), i;t+1 =  i;t+1,
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i;t+1 =  i;t+1, and i;s =   i;s for s = t; t+ 1, we can write the budget constraint (16) as
Wt+1 = (1+r)Wt+
X
i2At
(xi;t x i;t) [i;t + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1]+
X
i2At
(xi;t+x i;t)i;t+1 ct+1;
(17)
and the nancial constraint (9) as
Wt 
X
i2At

max
fj;t+1;j;t+1gj2I
xi;t [ i;t   i;t+1   i;t+1   Et(i;t+1) + i;t+1]
1 + r
+ max
fj;t+1;j;t+1gj2I
x i;t [i;t   i;t+1 + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1]
1 + r

: (18)
Two further simplifying properties are that i;t+1 is independent of i;t+1 and that xi;t and
x i;t must have opposite signs. The rst property holds in equilibrium, as we show in Sections
3 and 4. Intuitively, when arbitrageurs hold opposite positions in assets i and  i, their wealth
Wt+1 is independent of i;t+1 and the same is true of spreads, which depend on wealth. The second
property follows from arbitrageurs' optimization. Indeed, if xi;t and x i;t had the same sign, then
an arbitrageur would be able to reduce both in absolute value while holding xi;t   x i;t constant.
That would reduce his risk without aecting his expected excess return, as can be seen from the
budget constraint (17), and would relax the nancial constraint (18). Using the two simplifying
properties, we can write (18) as
Wt 
X
i2A
(jxi;tj+ jx i;tj) i + 2maxfi0;t+1gi02I f(xi;t   x i;t) [ i;t   i;t+1   Et(i;t+1) + i;t+1]g
1 + r
:
(19)
A nal simplifying property is that xi;t and x i;t must be (exact) opposites. Indeed, if xi;t +
x i;t 6= 0, then an arbitrageur could set xi;t + x i;t = 0 while holding xi;t   x i;t constant. That
would eliminate his exposure to i;t+1 without aecting his expected excess return, his exposure to
i;t+1 and i;t+1, and the nancial constraint (19). Using this property, we can simplify the budget
constraint (17) to
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;t [i;t + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1]  ct+1; (20)
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and the nancial constraint (19) to
Wt  2
X
i2A
jxi;tji +maxfj;t+1gj2I fxi;t [ i;t   i;t+1   Et(i;t+1) + i;t+1]g
1 + r
: (21)
The arbitrageur's optimization problem reduces to choosing positions in assets i 2 At, i.e.,
those with positive endowment shocks. Positions in the corresponding assets  i are opposites, and
positions in assets that are not part of active opportunities are zero. We conjecture that the value
function of an arbitrageur in period t is
Vt(Wt) = B log(Wt) +Gt; (22)
where Gt is a possibly stochastic function and B is a constant.
3 Riskless Arbitrage
In this section we solve for equilibrium when assets in each pair have identical payos (i = 0).
With identical payos, arbitrageur wealth Wt does not depend on the payo realizations because
arbitrageurs hold opposite positions in the assets in each pair. Hence, the return that arbitrageurs
earn from a period to the next is riskless. That riskless return, however, could change stochastically
over time. We rule out stochastic variation by assuming that the set
Ct  f(i; i; ui; i; hi   t) : i 2 Atg
describing the characteristics of active opportunities is deterministic. Thus, while arbitrageurs are
uncertain as to which opportunities will become active, they know what their overall return will
be. With a deterministic Ct, the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth, arbitrageur positions, and spreads
are deterministic. With deterministic spreads, the expected excess return of asset i simplies to
i;t = (1 + r)i;t   i;t+1: (23)
One setting that yields a deterministic Ct and that we emphasize later is as follows. The universe
I of risky assets is divided into 2N disjoint families In for n = 1; ::; N , with the assets in each family
forming a continuum and having the same characteristics (i; i; ui; i;Mi). Moreover, one asset
from each family is randomly drawn in each period to form an active opportunity (together with
the other asset in its pair). Under these assumptions, Ct is not only deterministic, but constant.
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The case of riskless arbitrage is a natural benchmark. It is highly tractable and yields useful
results and intuitions, which also facilitate the analysis of risky arbitrage in Section 4. We start
by deriving the rst-order conditions of outside investors and arbitrageurs in an equilibrium of
the conjectured form, i.e., symmetric with deterministic price discounts. We then impose market
clearing and show that such an equilibrium exists.
3.1 First-Order Conditions
3.1.1 Outside Investors
Since i;t+1 = 0 and i;t+1 is deterministic, the budget constraint (14) of an i-investor simplies to
wi;t+1 = (1 + r)wi;t + yi;ti;t + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1   ci;t+1: (24)
The only risk borne by the investor between periods t and t+ 1 is the payo shock i;t+1, and the
investor's exposure to that risk is yi;t + ui;t.
Proposition 1. The value function of an i-investor in period t is given by (15), where A = r and
Fi;t is deterministic. The investor's optimal position in asset i is given by the rst-order condition
i;t   if 0 [(yi;t + ui;t)i] = 0; (25)
where the function f(y) is dened by
exp

Af(y)
+A

 E

exp

  Ayi;t
(+A)i

: (26)
The rst-order condition (25) takes an intuitive form. The rst term in the left-hand side, i;t,
is the expected excess return of asset i. The second term, if
0 [(yi;t + ui;t)i], is a risk adjustment,
reecting the investor's risk from holding the position. Since the function f(y) is convex, as shown
in Lemma 1, the risk adjustment is increasing in the investor's exposure yi;t + ui;t. The investor's
rst-order condition amounts to setting the risk-adjusted expected excess return that she derives
from asset i to zero. This yields a standard downward-sloping demand: the investor's position yi in
asset i is increasing in the asset's expected excess return i;t and is hence decreasing in the asset's
price pi;t. The function if
0 [(yi;t + ui;t)i] can be interpreted as a pricing function, which yields the
expected excess return i;t as a function of the position yi;t of the \marginal investor."
Lemma 1. The function f(y) is non-negative, symmetric around the vertical axis (f( y) = f(y)),
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and strictly convex. It also satises f 0( y) =  f 0(y),f 0(0) = 0, and limy!1 f 0(y) = 1.
The function Af(y)+A is the cumulant-generating function of  
Ayi;t
(+A)i
. Cumulant-generating
functions are convex. Symmetry around the vertical axis follows because i;t is distributed sym-
metrically around zero. Symmetry implies f 0( y) =  f 0(y) and f 0(0) = 0.
The rst-order condition of  i-investors yields an optimal position that is the opposite to that
of i-investors. This follows from (25) and the observations that price discounts, expected excess
returns, and endowment shocks are opposites for assets i and  i, and that f 0(y) =  f 0( y).
3.1.2 Arbitrageurs
Since i;t+1 = 0 and i;t+1 is deterministic, the budget constraint (20) of an arbitrageur simplies
to
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;ti;t   ct+1; (27)
and the nancial constraint (21) simplies to
Wt  2
X
i2At
jxi;tji   xi;ti;t
1 + r
: (28)
Eq. (27) conrms that the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth are deterministic. The per-share return
of an active opportunity i is 2i;t, i.e., twice the expected excess return i;t of asset i. This return is
non-negative in equilibrium, as we show in Section 3.2. While i-investors earn i;t as compensation
for risk, arbitrageurs earn it riskfree because they can combine a position in asset i with one in
asset  i. Thus, when i;t > 0, arbitrageurs can earn a riskless return above the riskless rate r.
Eq. (28) shows that the collateral required to hold a position in an active opportunity i is larger
when asset payos are more volatile, i.e., i is larger, and when the opportunity oers a lower
return, i.e., i;t is smaller. In both cases this is because the maximum loss of the position is larger.
Proposition 2. The value function of an arbitrageur in period t is given by (22), where B = 1 
and Gi;t is deterministic. The arbitrageur's optimal consumption is
ct =
1  

Wt: (29)
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 If all active opportunities oer a zero return, i.e., i;t = 0 for all i 2 At, then the arbitrageur
is indierent between any combination of positions in these opportunities.
 If instead some active opportunities oer a positive return and the remainder a zero return,
then the arbitrageur holds non-zero positions only in opportunities with maximum return per
unit of collateral:
i 2 argmaxj2At
j;t
j   j;t : (30)
For these opportunities, positions are long in assets i 2 At, i.e., those with positive endowment
shocks. Moreover, the nancial constraint (28) binds.
The arbitrageurs' optimal investment policy can be derived intuitively as follows. Substituting
the optimal consumption (29) into the budget constraint (27), we can write the latter as
Wt+1 = 
"
(1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;ti;t
#
: (31)
Since assets i 2 At oer non-negative expected excess returns, arbitrageurs do not benet from
shorting them. Therefore, we can write the nancial constraint (28) as
Wt  2
X
i2At
xi;t (i   i;t)
1 + r
: (32)
Maximizing Wt+1 in (31) subject to (32) and xi;t  0 is a simple linear-programming problem.
Arbitrageurs invest only in those opportunities that oer the maximum return i;t per unit of
collateral i   i;t. Moreover, when some opportunities oer a non-zero return, arbitrageurs \max
out" their nancial constraint (32) because they can earn a riskless return above the riskless rate
r. Maximizing return per unit of collateral, i;ti i;t , is equivalent to maximizing return per unit of
volatility i;ti , and we focus on the latter from now on.
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3.2 Equilibrium
3.2.1 Arbitraging Arbitrage
Combining the arbitrageurs' optimal investment policy with that of outside investors, and imposing
market clearing, we can derive a sharp characterization of equilibrium returns and positions. We
denote by
Tt  fi 2 At : xi;t > 0g;
the set of active opportunities that arbitrageurs actually trade in period t, i.e., those in which they
hold non-zero positions.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, there exists t 2 [0; 1) such that in period t:
 Arbitrageurs trade only active opportunities i such that f 0(uii) > t. That is,
Tt = fi 2 At : f 0(uii) > tg:
 All active opportunities that arbitrageurs trade oer the same return t per unit of volatility,
while those that they do not trade oer return f 0(uii) 2 (0;t] per unit of volatility. That is,
i 2 Tt ) i;t
i
= t;
i 2 At=Tt ) i;t
i
= f 0(uii) 2 (0;t]:
Proposition 3 implies that active opportunities can be ranked according to f 0(uii). As can be
seen by setting yi;t = 0 in the outside investors' rst-order condition (25), f
0(uii) is the return
per unit of volatility that opportunity i would oer in the absence of arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs
trade only the opportunities for which f 0(uii) is above a cuto t 2 (0; 1). Their activity causes
the return per unit of volatility oered by these opportunities to decrease to the common cuto.
Opportunities for which f 0(uii) is below that cuto are not traded, and their return per unit of
volatility remains equal to f 0(uii).
Since the function f(y) is convex, f 0(uii) is increasing in the endowment shock ui and in the
volatility i. Thus, arbitrageurs are more likely to trade opportunities with higher volatility and
higher endowment shocks: these are the opportunities oering higher return per unit of volatility
in the arbitrageurs' absence.
21
The equalization of returns across traded opportunities can be interpreted as \arbitraging arbi-
trage." If a traded opportunity oered lower return per unit of volatility than another opportunity,
then arbitrageurs could raise their prot by redeploying their scarce capital to the latter. The
arbitraging-arbitrage result is at the basis of the contagion eects derived in Section 4. Suppose,
for example, that arbitrageurs experience losses in opportunity i. This forces them to scale back
their position in that opportunity, causing its return to increase. Arbitraging arbitrage induces
them, in turn, to redeploy capital to that opportunity and away from others, causing the return of
others to increase as well.
3.2.2 Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital
Using Proposition 3, we can determine the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth and the relationship
between wealth and t.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, arbitrageur wealth evolves according to
Wt+1 = 
1 + r
1 tWt: (33)
 If Wt > Wc;t  21+r
P
i2At iuii, then the nancial constraint is slack, arbitrageurs earn the
riskless rate r, all active opportunities are traded, and their return t per unit of volatility is
zero.
 If Wt < Wc;t, then the nancial constraint binds, and arbitrageurs earn a riskless return above
the riskless rate r. The return t per unit of volatility oered by all traded opportunities is
the unique positive solution of
2
1 t
1 + r
X
i2Tt
i

uii   (f 0) 1(t)

=Wt; (34)
and decreases in Wt.
When the variables i;t have a binomial distribution, t is a convex function of Wt.
The nancial constraint is slack when all active opportunities oer a zero return, i.e., i;t = 0
for all i 2 At. This happens when arbitrageurs fully absorb the endowment shocks of outside
investors, i.e., xi;t = iui for all i 2 At. Setting i;t = 0 and xi;t = iui in (32), we nd that Wt
must exceed the threshold Wc;t dened in Proposition 4. Since all active opportunities oer a zero
return, t = 0 and arbitrageurs earn the riskless rate r.
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When instead Wt < Wc;t, arbitrageurs cannot fully absorb the endowment shocks of outside
investors. Therefore, all active opportunities oer a positive return, the return t per unit of
volatility oered by all traded opportunities is also positive, and arbitrageurs earn a riskless return
above r. Moreover, when Wt decreases, t increases because arbitrageurs are less able to absorb
the endowment shocks.
Convexity of t means that a given drop in Wt causes a larger increase in t when it occurs
in a region where Wt is smaller. Clearly, this comparison holds between the constrained and the
unconstrained regions: a drop in Wt raises t when Wt < Wc;t, but has no eect on t when
Wt > Wc;t. The intuition for why the comparison can also hold within the constrained region is
as follows. When Wt is smaller than but close to Wc;t, all active opportunities are traded, and
hence a drop in Wt causes arbitrageurs to reduce their positions in all of them. Since the eect is
spread out across many opportunities, the reduction in each position is small, and so is the increase
in t. When instead Wt is close to zero, arbitrageurs concentrate their investment on a small
number of opportunities, and a drop in Wt triggers a large reduction in each position. Proposition
4 conrms the convexity of t under the sucient condition that the variables i;t that describe
asset payos have a binomial distribution. Proposition 5 shows that an equilibrium with all the
properties conjectured or shown in this section exists.
Proposition 5. A symmetric equilibrium exists in which price discounts i;t, outside investors'
positions yi;t, and arbitrageurs' positions xi;t and wealth Wt are deterministic. In this equilibrium,
price discounts are zero for assets that are not part of active opportunities, and expected excess
returns i;t are non-negative for assets with positive endowment shocks.
3.3 Steady State and Convergence Dynamics
We next derive a steady state by specializing our model to the stationary \asset family" set-
ting described at the beginning of Section 3. This steady state is deterministic, and used as
a basis for constructing a stochastic steady state in Section 4. We index the 2N families by
n 2 f N; ::; 1; 1; ::; Ng, with the convention that for an asset in family n the other asset in its
pair belongs to family  n, and that families n = 1; ::; N comprise the assets with the positive
endowment shocks. We denote by (n; n; un; n;Mn) the characteristics (i; i; ui; i;Mi) for all
assets i in family n. (As in the rest of Section 3, we assume i = 0.) The set of active opportunities
in period t is
A = f(n;m) : n 2 f1; ::; Ng;m 2 f1; ::;Mngg:
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Opportunity (n;m) consists of one asset in family n 2 f1; ::; Ng and one asset in family  n, and
remains active for m   1 more periods. We denote the former asset by (n;m) and the latter by
( n;m), and refer to m as the horizon of opportunity (n;m). The expected excess returns of assets
(n;m) and ( n;m) do not depend on m (Proposition 3), and neither do the arbitrageurs' and
outside investors' positions (Eqs. (10) and (25)). Hence, we index these quantities by the family
subscript, n or  n, and the time subscript, t. The price discounts of the two assets depend on m,
and we index them by the additional subscript m. Since arbitrageurs' positions do not depend on
m, we can write the set of active opportunities traded in period t as
Tt = f(n;m) : n 2 Nt;m 2 f1; ::;Mngg;
where we denote by Nt the subset of families in f1; ::; Ng whose assets are traded. We drop the
time subscript for steady-state values.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the wealthWt of arbitrageurs and the return t per unit of volatility
oered by all traded opportunities converge over time monotonically to steady-state values W and
.
 If (1 + r) > 1, then Wt increases toward W =1 and t decreases toward  = 0.
 If (1 + r) < 1   , where   maxn=1;:::;N f 0(unn) < 1, then Wt decreases toward W = 0
and t increases toward  = .
 Otherwise, the steady-state values are given by
W = 2
1 
1 + r
X
n2N
nMn

unn   (f 0) 1()
 2 (0;Wc); (35)
 = 1  (1 + r) 2 (0;); (36)
where Wc  21+r
PN
n=1 nMnunn. If Wt < W , then Wt increases toward W and t decreases
toward . If Wt > W , then Wt decreases toward W and t increases toward .
The dynamics in Proposition 6 can be derived by specializing Proposition 4 to the stationary
case. According to Proposition 4, the wealth of arbitrageurs increases between periods t and t+ 1
if  1+r1 t > 1. Intuitively, wealth increases if the return earned by arbitrageurs exceeds the rate at
which they consume. Arbitrageurs earn the riskless (net) return 1+r1 t   1, and consume at the rate
1 
 as shown in (29).
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Using Proposition 4, we can characterize how the return 1+r1 t 1 earned by arbitrageurs depends
on their wealth Wt. When Wt > Wc, all active opportunities oer a zero return, t = 0, and
arbitrageurs earn the riskless rate r. When instead Wt < Wc, t is positive, and arbitrageurs earn
a riskless return above r. Decreases in Wt within that region raise t and hence raise arbitrageurs'
return, which reaches its maximum value, corresponding to the maximum value of t, when Wt
goes to zero. Setting yi;t = 0 in the outside investors' rst-order condition (25), we nd that the
return per unit of volatility from an active opportunity (i; i) in the absence of arbitrageurs is
equal to f 0(uii). Therefore, the maximum value of t is   maxn=1;:::;N f 0(unn). Specializing
Proposition 4 to the stationary case ensures that the function linking t to Wt, and in particular
the parameters Wc and , are constant over time.
The dynamics of wealth in the stationary case follow from the above observations. When
(1 + r) > 1, arbitrageurs consume at a rate smaller than the riskless rate. Hence, their wealth
increases over time even if t = 0, i.e., all active opportunities oer a zero return, and becomes
arbitrarily large. When instead (1 + r) < 1   , arbitrageurs consume at a rate larger than the
maximum return that their trades can oer. Hence, their wealth decreases over time and converges
to zero.
In the intermediate case 1  < (1+r) < 1, the wealth of arbitrageurs converges to an interior
steady-state value. Indeed, when wealth is large, all active opportunities oer a zero return, and
wealth decreases because (1 + r) < 1. When instead wealth is close to zero, active opportunities
oer close to their maximum return, and wealth increases because 1  < (1+ r). Dynamics are
self-correcting: wealth decreases when it is large because arbitrageurs earn a low return, and wealth
increases when it is small because arbitrageurs earn a high return. The steady-state valueW implied
by these dynamics is smaller than Wc because the steady-state return earned by arbitrageurs must
exceed r to oset consumption. An increase in the subjective discount factor raises consumption,
and hence raises the steady-state return and lowers the steady-state wealth.
4 Risky Arbitrage
Most real-life arbitrage involves some risk. To introduce arbitrage risk in our model, we allow assets
in each pair to have non-identical payos (i > 0). The return that arbitrageurs earn from one
period to the next is then risky and arbitrageur wealth Wt is stochastic. We look for a symmetric
equilibrium in which Wt is the only stochastic state variable. We maintain the assumption that the
set Ct describing the characteristics of active opportunities is deterministic. This prevents charac-
teristics from becoming additional state variables. Because arbitrageurs hold opposite positions in
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the two assets in each pair, Wt does not depend on the realizations of i;t but only on those of i;t.
The same is true for positions and spreads.
We start by deriving the rst-order conditions of outside investors and arbitrageurs in an equi-
librium of the conjectured form. We then specialize our analysis to the case where arbitrage risk
is small (i small), and compute the equilibrium in closed form. Using our analytical solution, we
study how spreads, expected excess returns, and arbitrageur positions depend on cross-sectional
characteristics, how they respond to shocks, and whether the mobility of arbitrage capital across
markets makes them more stable.
4.1 First-Order Conditions
4.1.1 Outside Investors
An i-investor bears more risk than in the riskless-arbitrage case (i = 0). This is because asset
i's payo includes the additional component i;t+1, and because the asset's price discount i;t+1
varies stochastically following changes in arbitrageur wealth. As in the riskless-arbitrage case, the
investor sets the risk-adjusted expected excess return that she derives from asset i to zero. The
risk adjustment, however, includes a term reecting the additional risk. This is the third term in
the left-hand side of (37).
Proposition 7. The value function of an i-investor in period t is given by (15), where A = r
and Fi;t is a function of Wt. The investor's optimal position in asset i is given by the rst-order
condition
i;t   if 0 [(yi;t + ui;t)i] + Et
 Mi;t+1
Et[Mi;t+1] (i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1)

= 0; (37)
where
Mi;t+1  exp

  fA [(yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1   yi;ti;t+1] + Fi;t+1g
+A

:
4.1.2 Arbitrageurs
An arbitrageur bears the risk represented by i;t+1 and i;t+1. Because of that risk, he may
benet from shorting assets i 2 At, and so may amplify the price discrepancies induced by outside
investors' endowment shocks. Short positions in assets i 2 At may be benecial even though they
earn negative expected excess returns because they hedge long positions in other such assets. In the
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rest of this section we assume that short positions in assets i 2 At do not arise in equilibrium. This
assumption is satised, for example, when arbitrage risk is small and the expected excess returns
i;t of assets i 2 At exceed a (strictly) positive bound. This result is shown in Proposition 8 and
extends a result shown in Proposition 2 under riskless arbitrage.
When arbitrageurs hold long positions in an asset i 2 At, an increase in i;t+1 raises their wealth
and hence lowers the spread i;t+1 (which is positive). When instead arbitrageurs hold no position
in the asset, i;t+1 is independent of i;t+1. In either case, the minimum value  i of i;t+1 can
be realized jointly with the maximum value of i;t+1, which we denote by i;t+1. And conversely,
the maximum value i of i;t+1 can be realized jointly with the minimum value of i;t+1, which we
denote by 
i;t+1
. Using these observations, we can simplify the arbitrageurs' nancial constraint
(21) because we can determine the maximum loss scenario. A long position in asset i 2 At suers
its maximum loss when i;t+1 =  i and i;t+1 = i;t+1 (maximum spread and hence maximum
price discount for asset i). And conversely, a short position in the asset suers its maximum loss
when i;t+1 = i and i;t+1 = i;t+1. Eq. (21) becomes
Wt  2
X
i2At
jxi;tj (i + i) + x+i;t

i;t+1   Et(i;t+1)
  x i;t hEt(i;t+1)  i;t+1i  xi;ti;t
1 + r
; (38)
where x+i;t = maxfxi;t; 0g and x i;t = minfxi;t; 0g. Moreover, when xi;t  0 for all i 2 At, (38)
simplies to
Wt  2
X
i2At
xi;t

i + i + i;t+1   Et(i;t+1)  i;t

1 + r
: (39)
The constraint is more stringent than in the riskless-arbitrage case because of the additional risks
that the arbitrageur is subject to.
Proposition 8. The value function of an arbitrageur in period t is given by (22), where B = 1 
and Gt is a function of aggregate arbitrageur wealth. The arbitrageur's optimal consumption is given
by (29). When short positions in assets i 2 At are not optimal, as is the case when mini2At i;t
exceeds a positive bound and maxi2Atfi; i;t+1   Et(i;t+1)g is small,
 The arbitrageur's optimal positions are non-zero only in opportunities with maximum risk-
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adjusted return per unit of collateral
i 2 argmaxj2At
j;t + Et
h Mt+1
Et[Mt+1] (j;t+1 + Et(j;t+1)  j;t+1)
i
j + j + j;t+1   Et(j;t+1)  j;t
; (40)
where
Mt+1  1
(1 + r)Wt + 2
P
j2At xj;t [j;t + j;t+1 + Et(j;t+1)  j;t+1]
:
For these opportunities, positions are long in assets i 2 At.
 The nancial constraint (39) is slack if the maximum risk-adjusted return per unit of collateral
is zero, and binds if it is positive.
As in the riskless-arbitrage case, the arbitrageur invests only in those opportunities that oer
the maximum return per unit of collateral. When arbitrage is risky, however, that return includes
a risk adjustment that depends on arbitrageur risk aversion and position size. The risk adjustment
for arbitrageurs is dierent than for outside investors because market segmentation implies that
arbitrageurs bear dierent risks.
The arbitrageur's portfolio problem combines two aspects: allocate scarce capital to the most
protable opportunities, and trade o risk and return. When the nancial constraint is slack,
only the second aspect is present. The arbitrageur invests in any given arbitrage opportunity i
to take advantage of its positive expected excess return 2i;t. As he increases his position in
that opportunity, he bears more risk, and hence his risk-adjusted return decreases. The optimal
position renders the risk-adjusted return equal to zero. This is the standard rst-order condition
of a risk-averse investor.15
If the optimal positions under a slack nancial constraint violate that constraint, then the rst
aspect of the portfolio problem kicks in. To meet the nancial constraint, the arbitrageur scales
down his positions. As a consequence, he bears less risk and risk-adjusted returns become positive.
Positions are scaled down until the constraint is met, and in such a way as to maintain risk-adjusted
15The standard rst-order condition in a one-period setting is
E(MR) = 0, E(R) + E
 M
E[M] [R  E(R)]

= 0;
where R is an asset's excess return over the riskless asset and M is the pricing kernel. The risk adjustment is
E

M
E[M] [R  E(R)]

. It depends on the size of the position, which is why the optimal position is interior. (That
is, if the investor invests only in one asset, the risk-adjusted return of that asset declines below that of other assets,
inducing the investor to also invest in the other assets.)
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returns per unit of collateral equal across all opportunities for which positions remain positive.
The two aspects of the arbitrageur's portfolio problem can be completely separated in two special
cases. When asset payos are identical, only the rst aspect is present because the arbitrageur faces
no risk. When instead the common payo shock i;t+1 to both assets in a pair (i; i) is zero for
all pairs (i = 0), only the second aspect is present: the arbitrageur determines his positions by
trading o risk and return, and the nancial constraint is always slack.
Corollary 1. When i = 0 for all i 2 At, and short positions in assets i 2 At are not optimal, the
arbitrageurs' nancial constraint is slack.
The intuition for Corollary 1 is that when the common shock is not present, a long position in
asset i and a short position in asset  i can achieve their maximum loss at the same time. (That
is not possible in the common shock's presence because the long position achieves its maximum
loss when i;t+1 =  i, while the short position achieves its maximum loss when i;t+1 = i.)
Hence, requiring arbitrageurs to have sucient wealth in each market to cover any liabilities in
that market is equivalent to requiring them to be able to cover any overall liability. Moreover,
arbitrageurs choose their positions so to keep positive wealth and hence cover any overall liability
because logarithmic utility makes zero consumption prohibitively costly.
4.2 Equilibrium for Small Arbitrage Risk
To study the case where arbitrage risk is small, we set i = i and take  to be small holding i
constant. We also specialize our model to the stationary \asset family" setting described at the
beginning of Section 3, and focus on parameters for which the steady state derived in Section 3.3
is interior, i.e., arbitrageur wealth does not converge to zero or innity. Since arbitrageur wealth
Wt converges to the steady-state value W when  = 0, it converges to a stationary probability
distribution with support close to W when  is small. When Wt moves within the support of
the stationary distribution, as we assume from now on, the subset Nt of families whose assets are
traded in equilibrium could change over time. If we rule out, however, the non-generic case where
f 0(unn) =  for some n 2 f1; ::; Ng, then for  small enough Nt remains constant over time and
so does the set Tt of traded active opportunities. We hence drop the time subscript from both
sets. Since the support of the stationary distribution is close to W , expected excess returns i;t
of assets i 2 At exceed a positive bound. Hence, short positions in assets i 2 At are not optimal,
arbitrageurs' rst-order condition is (40), and the nancial constraint (39) binds.
We look for spreads, expected excess returns, and positions of arbitrageurs and outside investors
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that take the form
n;m;t = 
0
n;m;t + 
1
n;m;t + o () ; (41)
n;m;t = 
0
n;t +
1
n;m;t + o () ; (42)
xn;m;t = x
0
n;t + x
1
n;m;t + o () ; (43)
yn;m;t = y
0
n;t + y
1
n;m;t + o () ; (44)
for asset (n;m). The superscript 0 denotes the value of the corresponding variable, as a function
of Wt, in the case of riskless arbitrage (Section 3). The superscript 1 denotes a rst-order term in
 introduced by risk. As in Section 3.3, we drop the time subscript from zeroth- and rst-order
terms in (41)-(44) when these are evaluated at the steady-state value W .
We look for dynamics of wealth, within the support of the stationary distribution, that take
the form
Wt+1 =W + (Wt  W ) +  +
X
(n;m)2T
nn;m 1;t+1 + o () ; (45)
where (; ; fngn2N ) are constants. We compute these constants, as well as the rst-order terms
in (42)-(44), in the Appendix (Proposition A.1). We conrm, in particular, that  2 (0; 1). Thus,
to a rst-order in , Wt follows an AR(1) process. The mean to which this process reverts is equal
to W plus a rst-order term in . Variation around the mean is caused by the shocks n;m 1;t+1
for (n;m) 2 T . The coecient n describing how n;m 1;t+1 aects Wt+1 is given by
n =
2x0n
1 + 2
P
(n0;m)2T x
0
n0
d0
n0;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
; (46)
where the derivatives in the denominator are evaluated at Wt+1 = W . The intuition for (46) can
be seen from the budget constraint (20). Substituting the optimal consumption (29) and changing
asset subscripts from i to (n;m), we can write (20) as
Wt+1 = 
24(1 + r)Wt + 2 X
(n;m)2T
xn;m;t [n;m;t + n;m 1;t+1 + Et(n;m 1;t+1)  n;m 1;t+1]
35 : (47)
A negative shock n;m 1;t+1 reduces the wealth of arbitrageurs through the term 2xn;m;tn;m 1;t+1.
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This is the direct eect of the shock, holding spreads n0;m 1;t+1 constant, and corresponds to the
numerator in (46). There is also an indirect amplication eect, operating through a change in
spreads: because Wt decreases due to the direct eect, spreads increase, and this amplies the
reduction in Wt. The indirect eect corresponds to the second term in the denominator in (46),
which is negative hence lowering the denominator and raising n.
4.3 Economic Implications
4.3.1 Spreads, Returns, and Positions in the Cross-Section
An arbitrage opportunity (n;m) is described by ve characteristics: the volatility n of the payo
shock that is common to the two assets and which arbitrageurs can hedge via a long-short trade;
the volatility n of the payo shock which arbitrageurs cannot hedge away; the endowment shock
un of outside investors, which determines their relative demand for the two assets; the measure n
of outside investors; and the horizon m of the opportunity. We examine how these characteristics
aect spreads n;m;t, expected excess returns n;m;t, and arbitrageur positions xn;m;t.
Proposition 9. Suppose that arbitrage risk  is small. Holding constant all other characteristics
as well as arbitrageur wealth:
 An opportunity with higher hedgeable volatility n has a higher spread and expected excess
return, and attracts more investment by arbitrageurs.
 An opportunity with higher non-hedgeable volatility n has a higher spread and expected excess
return, and attracts less investment by arbitrageurs. The same holds for an opportunity with
longer horizon m.
 An opportunity with larger endowment shock un attracts more investment by arbitrageurs. It
has a higher spread and expected excess return, except when the comparison is between traded
opportunities, in which case spreads and expected excess returns are the same to the rst order
in .
 An opportunity with larger measure of outside investors n attracts more investment by arbi-
trageurs.
Outside investors in more volatile opportunities, i.e., those with higher n or n, are more eager
to share risk. Therefore, those opportunities oer higher expected excess returns in the arbitrageurs'
absence. Their expected excess returns remain higher even if arbitrageurs invest in them. Indeed,
arbitrageurs invest in opportunities with the highest return per unit of collateral, and more volatile
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opportunities require more collateral. In turn, higher returns imply higher spreads. Indeed, spreads
are a present value of future expected excess returns discounted at the riskless rate:
n;m;t = Et
 
m 1X
s=0
n;m s;t+s
(1 + r)s+1
!
; (48)
as can be seen by solving (13) backwards with the terminal condition n;0;t+m = 0.
16
The source of volatility, n or n, matters for arbitrageurs' positions. When hedgeable volatility
is higher (higher n), positions are larger. When instead non-hedgeable volatility is higher (higher
n), positions are smaller. The intuition comes from higher volatility having two countervailing
eects on arbitrageur positions: it raises positions because expected excess returns increase, but
it lowers positions because collateral requirements increase. Expected excess returns in the arbi-
trageurs' absence are proportional to the return variance, which for small  is proportional to 2n
plus second-order terms in .17 Collateral requirements are equal to a position's maximum possible
loss, which is n+n+n;m 1;t+1 Et(n;m 1;t+1) n;m;t from (39). The ratio of these quantities
(return per unit of collateral) is increasing in n but decreasing in n. In particular, an increase in
n has a second-order eect on the variance but a rst-order eect on the collateral requirement.
More generally, when arbitrage risk is small, its dominant eect on equilibrium variables is
through the nancial constraint rather than through risk aversion. Arbitrage risk raises the maxi-
mum possible loss of a position by a rst-order term in . The risk adjustments that it induces in
(37) and (40), however, are second-order in , as they involve an expectation of gains and losses
weighted by marginal utility. It is because of the eect through the nancial constraint that the
equilibrium variables in (41)-(44) include a rst-order term in .
The eect of horizon m on spreads follows from (48). Spreads of opportunities with a longer
horizon are the present value of a longer sequence of future returns, and hence are higher. The
eect of horizon on expected excess returns and arbitrageur positions is more subtle. Spreads
of opportunities with a longer horizon are more sensitive to shocks to arbitrageur wealth, as
we show in Section 4.3.2. As a consequence, these opportunities require more collateral (term
n;m 1;t+1   Et(n;m 1;t+1) in (39)), and higher collateral requirements push expected excess re-
turns up and arbitrageur positions down. Note that horizon has no eect on expected excess returns
16Because (13) is linear in spreads and expected excess returns, (48) is exact and not a small-risk approximation.
17The return variance can be computed using (12), the independence between n;t and fn0;tgn02N , the fact that
Wt is the only stochastic state variable aecting spreads, and the dynamics of of Wt in (45). Note that since the
eect of arbitrage risk on the return variance is second-order in , our analysis of the equilibrium for small arbitrage
risk would not change if instead of holding n constant when n varies, we also vary n so that the return variance
in the arbitrageurs' absence remains constant. Indeed, the required variation in n would be second-order in .
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or positions under riskless arbitrage. The eect instead arises because arbitrage risk impacts col-
lateral requirements, and is included in the rst-order terms in (42)-(44).
The eect of the endowment shock un on spreads, expected excess returns, and arbitrageur
positions is the same as under riskless arbitrage. In particular, spreads and expected excess returns
increase with un for non-traded opportunities and become at when un is large enough so that
opportunities are traded. The at part arises because traded opportunities oer the same return
per unit of collateral and because un does not aect the collateral requirement. The eect of the
measure n of outside investors on arbitrageur positions is also the same as under riskless arbitrage:
arbitrageurs hold larger positions in an opportunity where there are more outside investors.
4.3.2 Response to Shocks
We next examine how spreads, expected excess returns, and arbitrageur positions respond to shocks
to arbitrageur wealth, and how these dynamics depend on the characteristics of arbitrage oppor-
tunities. We focus on traded opportunities; non-traded opportunities are not aected by shocks.
For any given traded opportunity, spreads, expected excess returns, and arbitrageur positions
change over time both because arbitrageur wealth changes and because the opportunity's horizon
shortens. We focus on the wealth-induced variation, keeping horizon constant. Hence, we compare
spreads, expected excess returns, and arbitrageur positions across opportunities within the same
family and with the same horizon (same (n;m)) but at dierent points in time.
Proposition 10. Suppose that arbitrage risk  is small and that a shock in period t lowers arbi-
trageur wealth below its mean.
 The immediate eect is that spreads and expected excess returns increase, and arbitrageurs
scale down their positions.
 Following this immediate reaction, there is a recovery phase, during which spreads, expected
excess returns, and positions are expected to revert gradually toward their original values.
The dynamics in Proposition 10 follow from the self-correcting dynamics (45) of arbitrageur
wealth. Following a shock that lowers wealth in period t, wealth is expected to increase gradually
back to its mean. Spreads and expected excess returns are decreasing functions of wealth, and hence
increase instantly and then decrease gradually. By contrast, positions are increasing functions of
wealth, and hence decrease instantly and then increase gradually.
Proposition 11. Suppose that arbitrage risk  is small and that a shock in period t lowers arbi-
trageur wealth below its mean. Holding constant all other characteristics:
33
 For an opportunity with higher hedgeable volatility n, the immediate increase in spread and
expected excess return is larger, and the immediate decrease in arbitrageur positions is smaller.
 For an opportunity with higher non-hedgeable volatility n, the immediate increase in spread
and expected excess return is larger, and so is the immediate decrease in arbitrageur positions.
 For an opportunity with longer horizon m, the immediate increase in spread is larger. The im-
mediate increase in expected excess return and the immediate decrease in arbitrageur positions
are also larger if the steady-state value W of arbitrageur wealth Wt is large enough.
These comparisons remain the same during the recovery phase.
Spreads and expected excess returns of more volatile opportunities, i.e., those with higher n
or n, are more sensitive to changes in arbitrageur wealth. This is because changes in wealth
impact the return per unit of collateral, which arbitrageurs equalize across all opportunities in
which they invest. The resulting impact on returns, and hence on spreads, is stronger for more
volatile opportunities because they require more collateral.
Arbitrageur positions in more volatile opportunities can be more or less sensitive to changes in
wealth, depending on the source of volatility. Positions are less sensitive when volatility is higher
because of n, but more sensitive when it is higher because of n. The intuition parallels that
in Proposition 9. Following a drop in arbitrageur wealth, positions in all opportunities must be
scaled down, and the return per unit of collateral is equalized across opportunities at a higher
level. The increase in expected excess returns resulting from a cut in arbitrageur positions (i.e.,
the inverse elasticity of the demand of outside investors) is proportional to the return variance,
and hence to 2n plus second-order terms in . The ratio of this quantity to the collateral required
n+ n+ n;m 1;t+1 Et(n;m 1;t+1) n;m;t is increasing in n, and so positions in opportunities
with higher n must be cut by less to achieve the new higher level of return per unit of collateral.
The ratio is instead decreasing in n, and so positions in opportunities with higher n must be cut
by more. Put dierently, by cutting positions in opportunities with higher n, arbitrageurs save
a larger amount of collateral, and the returns of these opportunities do not increase suciently
following the cuts to compensate for that.
Spreads of opportunities with a longer horizon are more sensitive to changes in wealth because
they depend on a longer sequence of future returns, all of which are sensitive to wealth changes.
Because their spreads are more sensitive to changes in wealth, collateral requirements are higher
for long-horizon opportunities. In turn, this implies that expected excess returns and arbitrageur
positions for long-horizon opportunities tend to be more sensitive to wealth changes. At the same
time, wealth changes aect the required collateral as a function of horizon because they aect the
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volatility of equilibrium prices. If the incremental collateral required by longer-horizon opportuni-
ties decreases following a wealth drop, then expected excess returns and arbitrageur positions for
these opportunities can be less sensitive to wealth changes. This possibility is ruled out if W is
large enough.
Taken together, the results of Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 imply an increasing cross-sectional re-
lationship between spreads and expected excess returns on one hand, and betas with respect to
arbitrageur wealth on the other. Indeed, Proposition 9 shows that spreads and expected excess
returns are higher for more volatile opportunities and for opportunities with a longer horizon.
Moreover, Proposition 11 shows that spreads for the same opportunities increase more following a
drop in wealth. Hence, their realized returns decrease more and their wealth betas are higher.
The cross-sectional relationship implied by our model is consistent with recent empirical evi-
dence. Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2016) study the behavior of the cross-currency basis, which
is dened in Section 2.2.3 and is an arbitrage spread associated with violations of covered interest
parity. They nd that currencies with a higher basis are also those for which the basis increases
more when the dollar exchange rate increases. Moreover, increases in the exchange rate are as-
sociated with tighter funding conditions of currency-market arbitrageurs. Cho (2016) studies the
relationship between alphas of a wide cross-section of stock-market anomalies and the sensitivities
of these anomalies' returns to the funding conditions of broker-dealers. He nds no relationship
before 1993. After 1993, however, anomalies with higher alphas are also ones that yield lower
returns when funding conditions tighten. These ndings are consistent with arbitrageurs becoming
more active in trading the anomalies in the more recent sample.18
We show that an increasing cross-sectional relationship between spreads/returns and wealth
betas arises because of two mutually reinforcing mechanisms. High collateral requirements cause
spreads and expected excess returns to be high (through the equalization of return per unit of
collateral) and wealth betas to be high (through the dynamics implied by same channel). Moreover,
high wealth betas cause collateral requirements to be high (because the maximum possible loss of
a position increases) and feed back into high spreads and expected excess returns. Exogenous
characteristics can \activate" either of the two mechanisms, setting o the mutually reinforcing
cycle. Payo-shock volatility (n and n) activates the rst mechanism, as higher volatility pushes
up collateral requirements. Horizon (m) activates the second mechanism, as a longer horizon renders
spreads more sensitive to wealth. Versions of the rst mechanism have been shown in a number of
papers (e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanakoplos (2003), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
18Cho (2016) also nds that anomalies with higher protability before 1993 tend to have higher wealth betas after
1993. This is consistent with arbitrageurs allocating more wealth to the more protable anomalies: anomalies with
small un do not attract any investment and are not sensitive to changes in wealth, while the opposite holds when un
exceeds a threshold.
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Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), and Brumm, Grill, Kubler, and Schmedders (2015)). The second
mechanism is new to our model.
4.4 Mobility of Arbitrage Capital
Finally, we use our model to study how the mobility of arbitrage capital aects market stability.
Our maintained assumption so far is that all arbitrageurs can trade all assets and hence arbitrage
capital is fully mobile across markets. We contrast full mobility to the case where the assets in each
family pair (n; n) for n = 1; ::; N are traded by a separate set of arbitrageurs. We refer to the
former case as integrated arbitrage markets and to the latter as segmented arbitrage markets. These
notions of integration and segmentation are distinct from the asset-level segmentation concerning
outside investors and collateral requirements, which we continue to assume. Integration of arbitrage
markets could be triggered, for example, by a deregulation of international capital ows.
When arbitrage is riskless, integration and segmentation of arbitrage markets yield the same
steady state. Indeed, Proposition 6 applied to each segmented arbitrage market implies that arbi-
trageurs in market n have non-zero wealth in steady state if f 0(unn) > 1   (1 + r). Moreover,
the return per unit of volatility is  = 1   (1 + r) in the markets where arbitrageur wealth is
non-zero, and f 0(unn)   in the markets where it is zero. Since this return is the same across
the non-zero-wealth markets, and is lower in the zero-wealth markets, lifting the segmentation re-
striction has no eect: arbitrageurs are indierent between staying in their market or diversifying
into other non-zero-wealth markets, and the return per unit of volatility in all markets does not
change.
Corollary 2. Suppose that  = 0 (riskless arbitrage). In steady state, integration of arbitrage
markets has no eect on spreads and returns.
When arbitrage is risky, arbitrageurs strictly prefer diversifying across arbitrage markets as
long as risks are imperfectly correlated. We assume that risks are independent across markets,
i.e., the shocks n;m;t are independent across n. But while diversication is benecial for any
given arbitrageur assuming that others do not diversify, it has a countervailing eect when they
all diversify: it induces correlation between arbitrage markets, which makes diversication less
eective. This is because arbitrageurs who hold positions in multiple markets react to negative
shocks in one market by cutting positions in all markets|a contagion eect.
To examine whether diversication remains eective despite the correlation that it induces,
we compute the variance of arbitrageur wealth. We also compute the variance of spreads, which
can be interpreted a measure of market stability. We rst compare integration and segmentation
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when arbitrage opportunities are symmetric, i.e., (n; n; n; un;Mn) is independent of n, and then
consider the asymmetric case.
Proposition 12. Suppose that arbitrage risk  is small and that arbitrage opportunities are sym-
metric.
 The variance of each arbitrageur's wealth under integration is 1N times that under segmenta-
tion. It is also equal to the wealth variance of an arbitrageur who diversies across markets
when other arbitrageurs do not.
 The variance of each spread under integration is 1N times that under segmentation.
An arbitrageur who diversies across markets when other arbitrageurs do not enjoys a reduction
in the variance of his wealth by a factor ofN . This follows from a standard result in portfolio theory:
optimal diversication across N assets with i.i.d. returns results in a variance that is N times lower
than without diversication. Surprisingly, diversication lowers the variance by a factor of N even
when all other arbitrageurs diversify and hence markets become correlated. This is because while
spreads become perfectly correlated across markets, their variance is divided by N .
The intuition why the variance of the spreads is divided by N under integration is as follows.
Since the aggregate position of arbitrageurs in each market is the same under integration as under
segmentation when arbitrage is riskless, the same holds for small arbitrage risk to the highest
order in . Hence, a negative shock n;m;t causes the same drop in aggregate arbitrageur wealth
under integration as under segmentation, holding spreads constant. Under segmentation, only
arbitrageurs in market n are aected, and they cut their positions in that market. Under integration,
all arbitrageurs are aected, and they cut their positions in all markets. Because the drop in
aggregate wealth is the same in both cases and because markets are symmetric, the cut in each
market under integration is 1N times the cut in market n under segmentation. Hence, spreads in
all markets under integration increase by 1N times the increase in the spreads in market n under
segmentation. Moreover, the contribution of the shock n;m;t to the variance of the spreads in
market n under integration is 1
N2
of its contribution under segmentation. Because, however, N
times as many shocks (i.e., all shocks) contribute to the variance under integration, the variance of
the spreads is N  1
N2
= 1N times that under segmentation.
Proposition 13. Suppose that arbitrage risk  is small and that arbitrage opportunities are asym-
metric. Spreads of traded opportunities n 2 N for which unn (f 0) 1()
maxn02N [un0n0 (f 0) 1()] or
n
maxn02N n0
are
suciently small have higher variance under integration than under segmentation.
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Integration can raise the variance of spreads of opportunities with small endowment shocks
(small un) or low volatility (small n or n). For example, because arbitrageurs hold small positions
in opportunities with small un, payo shocks n;m;t have small eects on their wealth and on spreads,
resulting in low variances under segmentation. Instead, under integration, these opportunities are
exposed to shocks coming from other markets, so variances can increase.
5 Conclusion
We develop a model in which arbitrageurs' limited access to capital aects the functioning of nan-
cial markets. Arbitrageurs in our model are uniquely able to exploit price discrepancies between
assets traded in segmented markets, but face nancial constraints limiting their ability to do so. We
compute the equilibrium in closed form when arbitrage is riskless and when arbitrage risk is small.
In the latter case, arbitrage capital follows AR(1) dynamics in a stochastic steady state. We de-
termine how arbitrageurs allocate their limited capital across mispriced assets in steady state, and
how this allocation changes following shocks to capital. We also determine which arbitrage trades
oer the highest expected returns and how these returns relate to the trades' sensitivity to arbitrage
capital and other characteristics. We nally examine how the diversication of arbitrageurs across
markets aects the risk that they bear and the volatility of spreads.
When arbitrage risk is small, its rst-order eect on equilibrium variables is through the nan-
cial constraint rather than through risk aversion. Hence, our results on how characteristics such
as volatility, horizon, and investor demand aect expected returns and arbitrageur positions are
driven by the characteristics' eects on the nancial constraint. For general arbitrage risk, risk
aversion would come into play, and its eects might dier from those of the nancial constraint.
Determining the combined eects of risk aversion and the nancial constraint on the cross-section
of expected returns and arbitrageur positions is a natural extension of our research. This would
require computing the equilibrium for general arbitrage risk. Analysis of this equilibrium would
shed light on the role of arbitrage capital as a risk factor, and on how the signicance of this factor
is aected by the capitalization and diversication of arbitrageurs.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The proposition follows from Proposition 7 by setting i = 0 and noting
that arbitrageur wealth and spreads are deterministic.
Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the properties in the lemma, we set ^  A+A and ^i;t 
i;t
i
. Since
the distribution of ^i;t is independent of i and t, so is the function f(y). Since ^i;t has mean zero,
Jensen's inequality implies that
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]  exp(0) = 1;
and hence f(y)  0. Since ^i;t is distributed symmetrically around zero,
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)] = E [exp (^y^i;t)] ;
and hence f( y) = f(y). Dierentiating f( y) = f(y) we nd f 0( y) =  f 0(y), and setting y = 0
in f 0( y) =  f 0(y) we nd f 0(0) = 0. To show that f(y) is strictly convex, we show that f 00(y) > 0.
Since
f(y) =
log fE [exp ( ^y^i;t)]g
^
;
dierentiating once we nd
f 0(y) =  E [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)] ; (A.1)
and dierentiating twice we nd
f 00(y) = ^
E
h
^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]  fE [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]g2
fE [exp ( ^y^i;t)]g2
: (A.2)
The numerator in (A.2) is positive because of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [E(XY )]2  E(X2)E(Y 2),
which is strict when the random variables X and Y are not proportional. We can use the Cauchy-
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Schwarz inequality by setting
X  ^i;t exp

  ^y^i;t
2

;
Y  exp

  ^y^i;t
2

;
and noting that X and Y are not proportional because ^i;t is stochastic. Therefore, f
00(y) > 0. To
show that limy!1 f 0(y) = 1, we show that jf 0(y) 1j can be made smaller than 2 for any arbitrary
 > 0 when y goes to innity. Using (A.1) and the fact that ^i;t is distributed symmetrically around
zero with the supremum of its support being one, we nd
jf 0(y)  1j = E [(1 + ^i;t) exp ( ^y^i;t)]
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]
=
E
h
(1 + ^i;t) exp ( ^y^i;t)1f^i;t2[ 1; 1+]g
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)] +
E
h
(1 + ^i;t) exp ( ^y^i;t)1f^i;t2( 1+;1]g
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)] :
(A.3)
Since
(1 + ^i;t)1f^i;t2[ 1; 1+]g  ;
the rst term in the right-hand side of (A.3) is smaller than . The second term can also be made
smaller than  for large y. Indeed, multiplying numerator and denominator by exp ( ^y(1  )),
we can write this term as
E
h
(1 + ^i;t) exp ( ^y(^i;t + 1  ))1f^i;t2( 1+;1]g
i
E [exp ( ^y(^i;t + 1  ))] : (A.4)
Since ^i;t in the numerator of (A.4) exceeds  1 + , the numerator remains bounded when y goes
to innity. The denominator of (A.4) converges to innity, however, because i;t takes values in
[ 1; 1 + ) with positive probability.
Proof of Proposition 2: The results on the value function and optimal consumption follow from
Proposition 8 by noting that arbitrageur wealth is deterministic. Optimal positions are derived by
maximizing (A.26) with respect to fxi;tgi2At subject to the nancial constraint (21). Since i = 0
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and arbitrageur wealth and spreads are deterministic, we can write (A.26) as
max
fxi;tgi2At
(
(B + 1) log
 
(1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;ti;t
!
+ B log(B)  (B + 1) log(B + 1) + Gt+1
)
(A.5)
and (21) as (28). When i;t = 0 for all i 2 At, any combination of positions in the active
opportunities yields the same value for (A.5). When instead j;t > 0 for some j 2 At, (28)
binds for the optimal positions because otherwise the arbitrageur could raise (A.5) by raising xj;t.
Moreover, xi;t  0 for all i 2 At: if xj;t < 0 for some j 2 At, then setting xj;t to zero would
relax (28) while also not lowering (A.5). Since xi;t  0 for all i 2 At, (28) becomes (32). The
maximization in (A.5) subject to (32) and xi;t  0 for all i 2 At implies that xi;t > 0 only if i 2 At
maximizes return per unit of collateral.
Proof of Proposition 3: Proposition 2 implies that if arbitrageurs trade opportunity i then
i;t
i
is equal to a value t that is independent of i, and if they do not trade it then
i;t
i
 t. In the
former case, xi;t > 0 and (10) imply that yi;t < 0. Substituting into (25) and using the convexity
of f(y), we nd f 0(uii) >
i;t
i
= t. In the latter case, xi;t = 0 and (10) imply that yi;t = 0.
Substituting into (25), we nd f 0(uii) =
i;t
i
 t. Since f 0(y) < 1 for all y, t < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4: Proposition 3 shows that for all i 2 At, either xi;t > 0 and i;ti = t, or
xi;t = 0. We can hence write (31) and (32) as
Wt+1 = 
"
(1 + r)Wt + 2t
X
i2At
xi;ti
#
; (A.6)
Wt  2(1 t)
X
i2At
xi;ti
1 + r
; (A.7)
respectively. If t = 0, then (A.6) becomes (33). If instead t > 0, then (A.7) holds as an equality,
and substituting it into (A.6) we nd again (33).
If t = 0, then arbitrageurs earn the riskless rate r and Proposition 3 implies that all active
opportunities are traded. To determine a lower bound on Wt, we use market clearing and the
nancial constraint. Eq. (25) implies that f 0[(yi;t + ui)i] =
i;t
i
= 0 for all i 2 At. Since f(y) is
symmetric around the vertical axis (Lemma 1), f 0(0) = 0. Strict convexity of f(y) implies that
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f 0(y) is invertible and hence yi;t + ui = 0. Combining with (10), we nd xi;t = iui. Substituting
xi;t = iui into (A.7) and using t = 0, we nd Wt Wc;t.
If t > 0, then arbitrageurs earn the riskless return
1+r
1 t   1 > r and Proposition 2 implies
that the nancial constraint binds. To determine how t relates to Wt, we use market clearing and
the nancial constraint. Eq. (25) and Proposition 3 imply that f 0[(yi;t + ui)i] =
i;t
i
= t for all
i 2 Tt. Inverting this equation yields
(yi;t + ui)i = (f
0) 1(t)
) xi;t = iui   i (f
0) 1(t)
i
; (A.8)
where the second step follows from (10). Substituting (A.8) into (A.7), and recalling that xi;t = 0
for all i 2 At=Tt, we nd (34). Moreover, (A.7) implies that Wt < Wc;t because t 2 (0; 1),
0 < xi;t < iui;t for all i 2 Tt (from (A.8)), and xi;t = 0 for all i 2 At=Tt.
The left-hand side of (34) decreases in t because f
00(y) > 0 implies that f 0(y) is increasing.
Moreover, it is equal to zero for t = maxi2At f 0(uii) and to Wc;t for t = 0. Therefore, (34) has
a unique positive solution for Wt 2 (0;Wc;t), which decreases in Wt.
To show convexity of t, we dierentiate (34) implicitly with respect to Wt. We nd
dt
dWt
=   1
2
1+r
P
i2Tt i
h
uii   (f 0) 1(t) + 1 tf 00[(f 0) 1(t)]
i : (A.9)
The derivative dtdWt is continuous, except at Wt =Wc;t and at the points where the set Tt changes.
For those values of Wt, the left derivative is smaller than the right derivative. For Wt = Wc;t,
this is because the left derivative is negative and the right derivative is zero. For a point where Tt
changes, this is because the denominator for the right derivative minus that for the left derivative
is
2
1 + r
X
i2DT t
i

uii   (f 0) 1(t) + 1 t
f 00 [(f 0) 1(t)]

=
2
1 + r
X
i2DT t
i

1 t
f 00 [(f 0) 1(t)]

> 0;
where DT t denotes the additional opportunities that become traded to the right of that point.
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Therefore, t is convex if the function
uii   (f 0) 1(t) + 1 t
f 00 [(f 0) 1(t)]
is increasing in Wt, or equivalently is decreasing in t. This is also equivalent to the function
G(y)   y + 1  f
0(y)
f 00(y)
being decreasing in y because f 0(y) is increasing. The derivative of G(y) with respect to y has the
same sign as the function
G1(y)   2f 00(y)2   f 000(y)
 
1  f 0(y) :
Dierentiating (A.2) we nd
f 000(y) = ^2
242E [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)] E
h
^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]  fE [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]g2
fE [exp ( ^y^i;t)]g3
+
E
h
^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]  E
h
^3i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]
fE [exp ( ^y^i;t)]g2
35 :
(A.10)
Using (A.1), (A.2) and (A.10), we nd
G1(y) =  ^2

2
 
E

^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)

E [exp ( ^y^i;t)] +E [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]


E
h
^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]  fE [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]g2
fE [exp ( ^y^i;t)]g4
+ E [(1 + ^i;t) exp ( ^y^i;t)]

E
h
^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)]  E
h
^3i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)
i
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)]
fE [exp ( ^y^i;t)]g3
35 :
When the distribution of i;t is binomial, ^i;t has also a binomial distribution that takes the values
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1 and -1 with equal probabilities. Therefore,
E [exp ( ^y^i;t)] = E

^2i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)

= cosh(^y);
E [^i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)] = E

^3i;t exp ( ^y^i;t)

=   sinh(^y);
and the function G1(y) becomes
G1(y) =  ^2
2
 
cosh2(^y)  sinh(^y)
cosh4(^y)
:
Since cosh(x)  1 and cosh(x) > sinh(x), G1(y) is negative and hence G(y) is decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that in equilibrium (i) expected excess returns i;t for assets
i 2 At are given by Propositions 3 and 4, (ii) price discounts i;t for assets i 2 At are given by
solving (13) backwards with the terminal condition i;hi = 0:
i;t =
hi t 1X
s=0
i;t+s
(1 + r)s+1
; (A.11)
(iii) expected excess returns and price discounts for assets  i, i 2 At, are opposites to those for
assets i, and (iv) expected excess returns and price discounts for assets that are not part of active
opportunities are zero. The rst-order conditions of investors and arbitrageurs are then as in
Section 3.1. The analysis in that section and in Section 3.2 ensures that the markets for all assets
clear and that the quantities (Wt; i;t; yi;t; xi;t) have the properties in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6: The dynamics of Wt in the three cases of the proposition are as follows:
 If (1 + r) > 1, then (33) implies that Wt increases to W =1.
 If (1+ r) < 1 , then (33) implies that Wt decreases to W = 0 because  is the maximum
value of t.
 If 1  < (1 + r) < 1, then (33) implies that Wt remains constant when t is equal to the
steady-state value  given by (36). The steady-state value W of Wt is given by (35) because
of (34). When Wt < W , (33) implies that Wt+1 > Wt because t > . Conversely, when
Wt > W , (33) implies that Wt+1 < Wt because t < . To show that convergence of Wt to
W is monotone, we need to show that Wt+1 < W in the former case and Wt+1 > W in the
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latter case. Since (33) implies that
Wt+1  W = (1 + r)

Wt
1 t  
W
1 

;
convergence is monotone if the function F (Wt) =
Wt
1 t is increasing inWt, where t is dened
implicitly as function of Wt from Proposition 4. When Wt > Wc, F (Wt) is increasing in Wt
because t = 0. When Wt < Wc, (34) implies that
F (Wt) =
2
1 + r
X
i2Tt
i

uii   (f 0) 1(t)

:
Since f(y) is strictly convex and t decreases in Wt, F (Wt) is increasing in Wt. Since  > 0,
Proposition 4 implies that W 2 (0;Wc).
The dynamics of t in each of the three cases follow from the dynamics of Wt, and from the
dependence of t on Wt derived in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7: The investor's Bellman equation is
Vi;t(wi;t) = max
ci;t+1;yi;t
Et f  exp( ci;t+1) + Vi;t+1(wi;t+1)g : (A.12)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (A.12), we nd
  exp ( Awi;t   Fi;t) = max
ci;t+1;yi;t
Et f  exp( ci;t+1)
  exp ( A [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t) + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1   ci;t+1]  Fi;t+1)g :
(A.13)
where
 i;t+1(yi;t)  yi;ti;t + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1 + yi;t [Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1] :
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The rst-order condition with respect to consumption is
 exp( ci;t+1) = A exp ( A [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t) + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1   ci;t+1]  Fi;t+1)
(A.14)
) ci;t+1 =
A [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t) + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1] + Fi;t+1 + log
 

A

+A
: (A.15)
Hence, we can write the right-hand side of (A.13) as
max
yi;t
Et

 (+A)

exp ( A [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t) + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1   ci;t+1]  Fi;t+1)

= max
yi;t
Et
(
 (+A)

exp
 
  fA [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t) + (yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1] + Fi;t+1g+A log
 

A

+A
!)
(A.16)
= max
yi;t
Et
(
 (+A)

exp
 
  fA [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t)  f [(yi;t + ui;t)i]] + Fi;t+1g+A log
 

A

+A
!)
;
(A.17)
where the rst step follows from (A.14), the second from (A.15), and the third from the indepen-
dence of i;t+1 and  i;t+1(yi;t) and from (26) by setting y  (yi;t + ui;t)i. Using the denition of
 i;t+1(yi;t), we nd that the rst-order condition with respect to yi;t is
Et
(
exp
 
  fA [(1 + r)wi;t +  i;t+1(yi;t)  f [(yi;t + ui;t)i]] + Fi;t+1g+A log
 

A

+A
!
 i;t   if 0[(yi;t + ui;t)i] + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1	 = 0: (A.18)
Rearranging terms, we nd (37).
Substituting (A.17) into (A.13), we nd that the Bellman equation holds for all values of the
single state variable wi;t if
A =
A(1 + r)
+A
; (A.19)
Fi;t =   log Et
(
(+A)

exp
 
  fA [ i;t+1(yi;t)  f [(yi;t + ui;t)i]] + Fi;t+1g+A log
 

A

+A
!)
;
(A.20)
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where yi;t denotes the optimal position. Eq. (A.19) implies that A = r. Substituting into (A.20),
we nd
Fi;t =   log Et

(1 + r) exp
 r [ i;t+1(yi;t)  f [(yi;t + ui;t)i]]  Fi;t+1   r log(r)
1 + r

: (A.21)
Eq. (A.21) determines Fi;t in terms of yi;t and Fi;t+1.
Proof of Proposition 8: The arbitrageur's Bellman equation is
Vt(Wt) = max
ct+1;fxi;tgi2At
Et f log(ci;t+1) + Vt+1(Wt+1)g : (A.22)
Substituting (20) and (22) into (A.22), we nd
B log(Wt)+Gt = max
ct+1;fxi;tgi2At
Et
(
 log(ci;t+1) + B log
 
(1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
 i;t+1(xi;t)  ct+1
!
+ Gt+1
)
;
(A.23)
where
 i;t+1(xi;t)  xi;t [i;t + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1] :
The rst-order condition with respect to consumption is
1
ci;t+1
  B
(1 + r)Wt + 2
P
i2At  i;t+1(xi;t)  ct+1
= 0
) ci;t+1 =
(1 + r)Wt + 2
P
i2At  i;t+1(xi;t)  ct+1
B
=
Wt+1
B
(A.24)
) ci;t+1 =
(1 + r)Wt + 2
P
i2At  i;t+1(xi;t)
B + 1
; (A.25)
where the second equality in (A.24) follows from (20). Using (A.25), we can write the right-hand
side of (A.23) as
max
fxi;tgi2At
Et
(
(B + 1) log
 
(1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
 i;t+1(xi;t)
!
+ B log(B)  (B + 1) log(B + 1) + Gt+1
)
:
(A.26)
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The maximization is subject to the nancial constraint (21).
The optimal values of fxi;tgi2At are linear in Wt, as can be seen by setting xi;t  Wt!i;t and
noting that the maximization objective and constraint can be written solely in terms of f!i;tgi2At .
Using this observation and substituting (A.26) into (A.23), we nd that the Bellman equation holds
for all values of the single state variable Wt if
B = (B + 1); (A.27)
Gt = Et
(
(B + 1) log
 
(1 + r) + 2
X
i2At
 i;t+1(!i;t)
!
+ B log(B)  (B + 1) log(B + 1) + Gt+1
)
;
(A.28)
where f!i;tgi2At denote the optimal positions as fractions of wealth. Eq. (A.19) implies that
B = 1  . Substituting into (A.24), we nd (29). Eq. (A.28) determines Gt in terms of f!i;tgi2At
and Gt+1.
To characterize the optimal positions fxi;tgi2At , which are assumed to be non-negative, we rst
compute the derivative of (A.26) with respect to xi;t. This derivative is
2(B + 1)Et
(
i;t + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1
(1 + r)Wt + 2
P
j2At  j;t+1(xj;t)
)
= 2(B + 1)Et [Mt] ^i;t; (A.29)
where
^i;t  i;t + Et
 Mt
Et[Mt] (i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1)

:
We next show that under the optimal positions either (i) ^i;t = 0 for all i 2 At and (21) is slack, or
(ii) ^j;t > 0 for some j 2 At and (21) binds. If ^j;t > 0 for some j 2 At, then (21) binds because
otherwise the arbitrageur could raise (A.26) by raising xj;t. If instead ^i;t  0 for all i 2 At, then
these inequalities must hold as equalities, and hence (21) is slack (because ^i;t = 0 for all i 2 At is
the rst-order condition from the maximization in (A.26) when the constraint (21) is not imposed).
To show that the inequalities must hold as equalities, we proceed by contradiction, assuming that
^j;t < 0 for some j 2 At and distinguishing three cases. If xj;t > 0, then lowering xj;t would raise
(A.26) while also relaxing (21). If xj;t = 0 and xj0;t > 0 for some j
0 2 At, j0 6= j, then lowering
xj0;t would relax (21) while also not lowering (A.26) because ^j0;t  0. With (21) relaxed, the
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arbitrageur could raise (A.26) by lowering xj;t (to a negative value). If, nally, xi;t = 0 for all
i 2 At, then (21) is slack, and hence lowering xj;t would raise (A.26).
When optimal positions fxi;tgi2At are non-negative, the maximization in (A.26) can be carried
out subject to (39) and xi;t  0, rather than subject to (21). This maximization implies that
xi;t > 0 only if i 2 At maximizes risk-adjusted return per unit of collateral. (This is obvious in the
case where ^i;t = 0 for all i 2 At. In the case where ^j;t > 0 for some j 2 At, it can be shown by
lowering xi;t > 0 for an i 2 At that does not maximize risk-adjusted return per unit of collateral
and raising xi;t  0 for an i that does, in a way that keeps (39) binding.)
When mini2At i;t exceeds a positive bound and maxi2Atfi; i;t+1 Et(i;t+1)g is small, ^i;t > 0
for all i 2 At, and hence (21) binds. Moreover, short positions are not optimal: if xj;t < 0 for some
j 2 At, then setting xj;t to zero would raise (A.26) and relax (21).
Proof of Corollary 1: When optimal positions fxi;tgi2At are non-negative, the maximization in
(A.26) can be carried out subject to (39) and xi;t  0. Consider this maximization when (39) is
not imposed. Because of logarithmic utility, the solution satises
(1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
 i;t+1(xi;t) > 0
, (1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;t [i;t + i;t+1 + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1] > 0 (A.30)
for all realizations of uncertainty in period t+1, including when i;t+1 =  i for all i 2 At. Under
the latter realization, and because fxi;tgi2At are non-negative, the spreads i;t+1 for all i 2 At reach
their maximum values i;t+1. Since a long position in asset i 2 At suers its maximum loss when
i;t+1 =  i and i;t+1 = i;t+1, (A.30) holds for all realizations of uncertainty in period t+ 1 if
(1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;t

i;t   i + Et(i;t+1)  i;t+1

> 0: (A.31)
Equation (A.31) implies that when i = 0 for all i 2 At, (39) holds as a strict inequality and hence
is slack.
We next state and prove Proposition A.1 which characterizes the equilibrium for small arbitrage
risk. We denote by 0 the derivative of t dened in (34) with respect to Wt at the steady-state
value Wt =W .
Proposition A.1. Suppose that  is small. The dynamics of arbitrageur wealth take the form (45),
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with
 = 1 +
W0
1  ; (A.32)
 = 2
X
(n;m)2T
 
x0n
1
n;m + x
1
n;m
0
n

; (A.33)
and n given by (46). Expected excess returns, and positions of arbitrageurs and outside investors
take the form (42)-(44), with (0n;t; x
0
n;t; y
0
n;t) as in Section 3, and
1n;m;t =
8><>:
t

n   d
0
n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0

+1t n; if (n;m) 2 T
0; otherwise
(A.34)
x1n;m;t =  ny1n;m;t; (A.35)
y1n;m;t =
1n;m;t
2nf
00  y0n;t + un n ; (A.36)
1t 
(1 t)
P
(n;m)2T

x0n;t   ntnf 00[(y0n;t+un)n]

n   d
0
n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0

P
n2N

x0n;tn + (1 t) ntf 00[(y0n;t+un)n]
 ;
(A.37)
n;t 
2x0n;t
1 + 2
P
(n0;m)2T x
0
n0;t
d0
n0;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
: (A.38)
The derivative
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
in (A.34), (A.37), and (A.38) is evaluated for Wt+1 implied by the
dynamics (33) under riskless arbitrage.
Proof: The dynamics (45) of arbitrageur wealth can be derived from (47). Since the spreads
fn;m 1;t+1g(n;m)2T depend on Wt+1, (47) determines Wt+1 implicitly as a function F of Wt, of
the shocks fn;m 1;t+1g(n;m)2T , and of . For a xed Wt and small , the Taylor expansion of F is
Wt+1 = F +
X
(n;m)2T
@F
@n;m 1;t+1
n;m 1;t+1 +
@F
@
 + o () ; (A.39)
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where F and its derivatives are evaluated at (Wt; 0; 0). Using (A.39), we nd
Et(n;m 1;t+1)  n;m 1;t+1 = Et(0n;m 1;t+1)  0n;m 1;t+1 + o ()
= Et
0@0n;m 1;t+1(F ) + d0n;m 1;t+1dWt+1
0@ X
(n0;m0)2T
@F
@n0;m0 1;t+1
n0;m0 1;t+1 +
@F
@

1A1A
  0n;m 1;t+1(F ) 
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
0@ X
(n0;m0)2T
@F
@n0;m0 1;t+1
n0;m0 1;t+1 +
@F
@

1A+ o ()
=  d
0
n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
X
(n0;m0)2T
@F
@n0;m0 1;t+1
n0;m0 1;t+1 + o () ; (A.40)
where the derivative
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
is evaluated forWt+1 = F (Wt; 0; 0). Substituting (41)-(43), (A.39),
and (A.40) into (47), we nd
F +
X
(n;m)2T
@F
@n;m 1;t+1
n;m 1;t+1 +
@F
@
 = 
24(1 + r)Wt + 2 X
(n;m)2T
(x0n;t + x
1
n;m;t)

0@0n;t +1n;m;t + n;m 1;t+1   d0n;m 1;t+1dWt+1 X
(n0;m0)2T
@F
@n0;m0 1;t+1
n0;m0 1;t+1
1A35+ o () ;
(A.41)
Identifying highest-order terms in n;m 1;t+1 in (A.41) we nd
@F
@n;m 1;t+1
=
2x0n;t
1 + 2
P
(n0;m0)2T x
0
n0;t
d0
n0;m0 1;t+1
dWt+1
= n;t; (A.42)
and identifying highest-order terms in  we nd
@F
@
= 2
X
(n;m)2T
 
x0n;t
1
n;m;t + x
1
n;m;t
0
n;t

: (A.43)
When Wt lies in the support of the stationary distribution, its maximum distance from the
steady-state value W is of order  since this is the maximum size of the shocks. Hence, we can
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write (A.39) as
Wt+1 =W +
@F
@Wt
(Wt  W ) +
X
(n;m)2T
@F
@n;m 1;t+1
n;m 1;t+1 +
@F
@
 + o () ; (A.44)
where F and its derivatives are now evaluated at (W; 0; 0). Since F (Wt; 0; 0) = 
1+r
1 tWt,
@F
@Wt
= 
1 + r
1  + 
(1 + r)0
(1 )2 W = 1 +
W0
1  ;
where the second step follows from (36). Since, in addition, (A.42) and (A.43) imply
@F
@n;m 1;t+1
= n;
@F
@
= ;
respectively, when partial derivatives are evaluated at (W; 0; 0), (A.44) becomes (45). The coecient
 is smaller than one because t decreases in Wt. It is larger than zero because the function
Wt
1 t
increases in Wt, as shown in the proof of Proposition 6.
We next derive the rst-order terms in expected excess returns and positions. Substituting (42)
and (44) into (37), and noting that the third term in the left-hand side is of second order in , we
nd
0n;t +
1
n;m;t   if 0

(y0n;t + ui;t)i
  2i f 0 (y0n;t + ui;t)i y1n;m;t + o () = 0: (A.45)
Identifying terms in , we nd (A.36). Substituting (43) and (44) into (10) and identifying terms
in , we nd (A.35). Substituting (42), (43), (A.40), and (A.42) into (40), and noting that the
second term in the numerator is of second order in , we nd that
0n;t +
1
n;m;t
n + n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0
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is identical for all (n;m) 2 T to a rst order in . Since 
0
n;t
n
= t for all (n;m) 2 T ,
0n;t +
1
n;m;t
n + n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0
 t
=
1n;m;t  t

n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0

n + n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0
 1t  (A.46)
is identical for all (n;m) 2 T to a rst order in . Multiplying by the denominator in (A.46), we
nd
1n;m;t = t
 
n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0
!
+1t n + o () (A.47)
for all (n;m) 2 T . Since n = n, (A.47) implies (A.34) for (n;m) 2 T . For (n;m) =2 T , xn;m;t = 0
and hence x1n;m;t = 0. Eq. (A.35) then implies y
1
n;m;t = 0, and (A.36) implies 
1
n;m;t = 0.
To compute 1t , we use the nancial constraint (39), which binds. Substituting (42), (43),
(A.40), and (A.42) into (39), we nd
Wt = 2
X
(n;m)2T
 
x0n;t + x
1
n;m;t

n + n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0   0n;t   1n;m;t

1 + r
+o () :
(A.48)
Identifying rst-order terms in , we nd
X
(n;m)2T
"
x0n;t
 
n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0   1n;m;t
!
+ x1n;m;t
 
n   0n;t
#
= 0
, (1 t)
X
(n;m)2T
"
x0n;t
 
n  
d0n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0
!
+ x1n;m;tn
#
 1t
X
(n;m)2T
x0n;tn = 0;
(A.49)
where the second step follows from (A.47) and
0n;t
n
= t for all (n;m) 2 T . Noting from (A.34)-
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(A.36) that
x1n;m;t =  ny1n;m;t
=   n
1
n;m;t
2nf
00  y0n;t + un n
=  
n

t

n   d
0
n;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
P
n02N Mn0n0;tn0

+1t n

2nf
00  y0n;t + un n ;
and substituting into (A.49), we nd a linear equation in 1t , whose solution is (A.37).
Proof of Proposition 9: For each characteristic, we compare two arbitrage opportunities that
dier only in that characteristic, and we assume that arbitrage risk is small. We can perform the
comparison by examining how spreads, expected excess returns, and positions corresponding to one
arbitrage opportunity (n;m) depend on that characteristic, holding aggregate variables constant. If
zeroth-order terms in spreads, expected excess returns, and positions depend on the characteristic,
then we use those to determine the characteristic's eect; otherwise, we use rst- or second-order
terms.
The comparative statics with respect to n follow from the zeroth-order terms. Proposition 3
implies that 0n;t increases in n: it does so both in the region where the opportunity is not traded
because n is below a threshold and in the region where the opportunity is traded because n is
above the threshold. Since 0n;t increases in n, so does 
0
n;m;t because of (48). The arbitrageur
position xn;m;t increases in n because it is zero in the region where the opportunity is not traded
and because (A.8) implies that x0n;t increases in n in the region where the opportunity is traded.
The comparative statics with respect to n follow from the rst-order terms, or the second-
order terms, or are trivial. Suppose that the opportunity is traded. Eq. (A.34) implies that 1n;m;t
increases in n and hence in n. Eq. (48) then implies that 
1
n;m;t increases in n, and (A.35) and
(A.36) imply that x1n;m;t decreases in n. Suppose next that the opportunity is not traded. Eq.
(A.34) implies that 1n;m;t = 0, so we need to consider the second-order term, which we can derive
from the rst-order condition of outside investors. Since the opportunity is not traded, the presence
of arbitrageurs is immaterial, so spreads and the outside investors' value function are independent of
arbitrageur wealth. Using these observations, the independence of the payo shocks (n;m;t; n;m;t),
and the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 7, we nd the rst-order condition
n;m;t   nf 0 (unn)  nf 0 (unn) = 0: (A.50)
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Eq. (A.50) implies that n;m;t increases in n. Eq. (48) then implies that n;m;t also increases in
n. The arbitrageur position xn;m;t is zero, and hence decreases weakly in n.
The comparative statics of spreads with respect to m follow from the zeroth-order term. Those
of expected excess returns and positions follow from the rst-order terms or are trivial. Identifying
zeroth-order terms in (48) and noting that at the zeroth order the dynamics ofWt are deterministic,
we nd
0n;m;t =
m 1X
s=0
0n;t+s
(1 + r)s+1
(A.51)
) d
0
n;m;t
dWt
=
m 1X
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
d0n;t+s
dWt
) d
0
n;m;t
dWt
=
m 1X
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
d0n;t+s
dWt+s
dWt+s
dWt
: (A.52)
Subtracting (A.51) and (A.52) from their counterparts for m+ 1, we nd
0n;m+1;t   0n;m;t =
0n;t+m
(1 + r)m+1
; (A.53)
d0n;m+1;t
dWt
  d
0
n;m;t
dWt
=
1
(1 + r)m+1
d0n;t+m
dWt+m
dWt+m
dWt
; (A.54)
respectively. Since 0n;t+m > 0, (A.53) implies that 
0
n;m;t increases in m. Since the function
Wt
1 t is
increasing inWt (as shown in the proof of Proposition 6), Proposition 4 implies thatWt+s increases
in Wt for s  1. Since, in addition, t decreases in Wt (Proposition 4), Proposition 3 implies that
0n;t for a traded opportunity decreases in Wt. Hence, (A.52) implies that 
0
n;m;t decreases in Wt.
Moreover, (A.54) implies that
d0n;m;t
dWt
decreases in m, becoming more negative for larger m. Eq.
(A.34) then implies that 1n;m;t increases in m, and (A.35) and (A.36) imply that x
1
n;m;t decreases
in m. Eq. (A.50) implies that n;m;t is independent of m for a non-traded opportunity, and hence
increases weakly in m. The arbitrageur position xn;m;t is zero, and hence decreases weakly in m.
The comparative statics with respect to un follow from the zeroth-order terms, or cannot be
determined from the zeroth- and rst-order terms, or are trivial. Proposition 3 implies that 0n;t
increases in un in the region where the opportunity is not traded because un is below a threshold.
Eq. (A.34) then implies that 0n;m;t increases in un. In the region where the opportunity is traded
because un is above the threshold, both zeroth- and rst-order terms in expected excess returns
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are independent of un. The arbitrageur position xn;m;t increases in un because it is zero in the
region where the opportunity is not traded and because (A.8) implies that x0n;t increases in un in
the region where the opportunity is traded.
The comparative statics with respect to n follow from the zeroth-order terms or are trivial.
For a traded opportunity, (A.8) implies that x0n;t increases in n. For a non-traded opportunity
xn;m;t is zero, and hence increases weakly in n.
Proof of Proposition 10: The proposition follows by combining the AR(1) dynamics (45) of
arbitrageur wealth Wt with the dependence of spreads, expected excess returns, and arbitrageur
positions on Wt. This dependence can be deduced from the zeroth-order terms. As shown in the
proof of Proposition 9, 0n;t and 
0
n;m;t decrease in Wt. Moreover, since t decreases in Wt (A.8)
implies that x0n;t increases in Wt.
Proof of Proposition 11: The comparative statics with respect to n follow from the zeroth-order
terms. Since 0n;t = tn for traded opportunities, 
0
n;t is more sensitive to changes in Wt for an
opportunity with higher n. The higher sensitivity of 
0
n;t translates to a higher sensitivity of 
0
n;m;t
because of (A.52). Eq. (A.8) implies that x0n;t is less sensitive to changes in Wt.
The comparative statics with respect to n follow from the rst-order terms. Since (A.34)
implies that
@21n;m;t
@t@n
> 0, 1n;m;t is more sensitive to changes in Wt for a traded opportunity with
higher n. The higher sensitivity of 
1
n;m;t translates to a higher sensitivity of 
1
n;m;t because of
(48), and to a higher sensitivity of x0n;m;t because of (A.35) and (A.36).
The comparative statics of spreads with respect to m follow from
d0n;m+1;t
dWt
<
d0n;m;t
dWt
< 0. Those
of expected excess returns and positions follow from the rst-order terms. Eq. (A.34) implies that
1n;m+1;t   1n;m;t =  t
d(0n;m;t+1   0n;m 1;t+1)
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0
=   t
(1 + r)m+1
d0n;t+m+1
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0
) d
1
n;m+1;t
dWt
  d
1
n;m;t
dWt
=  
dt
dWt
(1 + r)m+1
d0n;t+m+1
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0
  t
(1 + r)m+1
d
dWt
 
d0n;t+m+1
dWt+1
X
n02N
Mn0n0;tn0
!
; (A.55)
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where the second step follows from (A.51). If t is positive but close to zero (as is the case when
the steady-state value W of Wt is smaller than but close to Wc), then the rst term in the right-
hand side of (A.55) is negative and bounded away from zero, while the second term is close to zero.
Hence,
d1n;m+1;t
dWt
<
d1n;m;t
dWt
. Since the zeroth-order term in n;m;t is independent of m and
d0n;t
dWt
< 0,
d1n;m+1;t
dWt
<
d1n;m;t
dWt
implies
dn;m+1;t
dWt
<
dn;m;t
dWt
< 0. Hence, n;m;t is more sensitive to changes in
Wt for a traded opportunity with higher m. To show that positions are also more sensitive, we
note from (A.35) and (A.36) that
dx1n;m+1;t
dWt
 dx
1
n;m;t
dWt
=  
n

d1n;m+1;t
dWt
  d
1
n;m;t
dWt

2nf
00  y0n;t + un n +n
 
1n;m+1;t   1n;m;t

nf 00
 
y0n;t + un

n
 f 000  y0n;t + un n dy0n;tdWt :
(A.56)
If t is close to zero, so is 
0
n;t (Proposition 3) and hence y
0
n;t + un (Proposition 1). Since f(y) is
symmetric around the vertical axis, f 000(0) = 0 and hence f 000
 
y0n;t + un

n

is close to zero when
y0n;t + un is close to zero. Since the rst term in the right-hand side of (A.56) is positive and the
second is close to zero,
dx1n;m+1;t
dWt
>
dx1n;m;t
dWt
. Since the zeroth-order term in xn;m;t is independent of
m and
dx0n;t
dWt
> 0,
dx1n;m+1;t
dWt
>
dx1n;m;t
dWt
implies
dxn;m+1;t
dWt
>
dxn;m;t
dWt
> 0. Hence, xn;m;t is more sensitive
to changes in Wt for a traded opportunity with higher m.
Proof of Corollary 2: The proof follows from the argument in the paragraph just before the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 12: Using (A.8), we can write (46) for a traded opportunity (n;m) as
n =
2n
h
un   (f
0) 1()
n
i
1 + 2
P
(n0;m)2T n0
h
un0   (f
0) 1()
n0
i d0
n0;m 1;t+1
dWt+1
=
2
h
un   (f
0) 1()
n
i
1 + 2
P
n02N
h
un0   (f
0) 1()
n0
iPMn 1
m=1
d0
n0;m;t
dWt
(A.57)
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Since 0n;t = tn, (A.52) implies that
d0n;m;t
dWt
=
dt
dWt
n
m 1X
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
dWt+s
dWt
=
dt
dWt
n
m 1X
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
s 1Y
s0=0
dWt+s0+1
dWt+s0
: (A.58)
Eq. (A.9) implies that in steady state
@t
@Wt
=   1
2
1+r
P
n2N nMn
h
unn   (f 0) 1() + 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
i : (A.59)
The argument used in the proof of Proposition A.1 to show the AR(1) dynamics of Wt implies that
in steady state and for s  0
dWt+s+1
dWt+s
=
dWt+1
dWt
= : (A.60)
Using (A.32), we nd
 = 1 +
W0
1 
= 1 
2 1 
1+r
P
n2N nMn[unn (f 0) 1()]
2
1+r
P
n2N nMn

unn (f 0) 1()+ 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]

1 
=
P
n2N nMn
1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]P
n2N nMn
h
unn   (f 0) 1() + 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
i ; (A.61)
where the second step follows from (A.59). Using (A.59)-(A.61), we can write (A.58) as
@0n;m;t
@Wt
=  
n
Pm 1
s=0
s
(1+r)s
2
P
n02N n0Mn0
h
un0n0   (f 0) 1() + 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
i ; (A.62)
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and (A.57) as
n =
2n
h
un   (f
0) 1()
n
i
1  
P
n02N n0 [un0n0 (f 0) 1()]
PMn 1
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Pm 1
s=0
s
(1+r)sP
n02N n0Mn0

un0n0 (f 0) 1()+ 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
 : (A.63)
Under segmentation, the wealth Wn;t of arbitrageurs in market n 2 N evolves according to the
AR(1) process
Wn;t+1 =Wn + n(Wn;t  Wn) + n + n;n
MnX
m=1
n;m 1;t+1 + o () : (A.64)
The counterparts of (A.61)-(A.63) can be obtained by removing the summation over N , and are
n =
1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
unn   (f 0) 1() + 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
; (A.65)
@0n;m;t
@Wn;t
=  
n
Pm 1
s=0
sn
(1+r)s
2nMn
h
unn   (f 0) 1() + 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
i ; (A.66)
n;n =
2n
h
un   (f
0) 1()
n
i
1  [unn (f
0) 1()]
PMn 1
m=1
Pm 1
s=0
sn
(1+r)s
Mn

unn (f 0) 1()+ 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
 ; (A.67)
respectively.
Suppose next that opportunities are symmetric, and denote by (; ; ; u;M) the common values
of (n; n; n; un;Mn) and by 
2
 the common variance of n;m;t. Symmetry and an interior steady
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state imply that all opportunities are traded, i.e., N = f1; ::; Ng. Moreover, for all n = 1; ::; N ,
n =  =
1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
u  (f 0) 1() + 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
(A.68)
@0n;m;t
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1
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@0n;m;t
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s=0
s
(1+r)s
2M
h
u  (f 0) 1() + 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
i  W;m (A.69)
n = n;n =
2
h
u  (f 0) 1()
i
1  [u (f
0) 1()]
PM 1
m=1
Pm 1
s=0
s
(1+r)s
M

u (f 0) 1()+ 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
  ; (A.70)
because of (A.61) and (A.65), (A.62) and (A.66), and (A.63) and (A.67), respectively.
The variance of arbitrageur wealth under integration follows from the mean-reverting dynamics
(45), and is
Var(Wt) =
P
(n;m)2T 
2
nVar(n;m;t)
1  2 + o
 
2

: (A.71)
Likewise, the variance of arbitrageur wealth under segmentation can be computed from (A.64), and
is
Var(Wn;t) =
PMn
m=1 
2
n;nVar(n;m;t)
1  2n
+ o
 
2

: (A.72)
Under symmetry, the highest-order term in (A.71) is
NM22
1 2 , and that in (A.72) is
M22
1 2 . Since
the wealth of the arbitrageurs who are in market n under segmentation is WtN under integration, the
highest-order term in the variance of those arbitrageurs' wealth is
M22
N(1 2) under integration and
M22
1 2 under segmentation. Therefore, the variance of each arbitrageur's wealth under integration is
N times smaller than under segmentation. The variance of wealth of an arbitrageur who diversies
across all opportunities equally under segmentation is N times smaller than without diversication
because spreads are independent across n.
60
The variance of the spread associated to opportunity (n;m) is
Var(n;m;t) =
 
d0n;m;t
dWt
!2
Var(Wt) + o
 
2

(A.73)
under integration, and
Var(n;m;t) =
 
d0n;m;t
dWn;t
!2
Var(Wn;t) + o
 
2

(A.74)
under segmentation, where the derivative is evaluated at Wt = W . Under symmetry, the highest-
order term in (A.73) is
NM22
2
W;m
1 2 , and that in (A.74) is
N2M22
2
W;m
1 2 . Therefore, the variance
of spreads under integration is N times smaller than under segmentation.
Proof of Proposition 13: Eqs. (A.61), (A.63), and (A.71) imply that the variance of the arbi-
trageur wealth under integration is
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2
P
n2N 
2
nMn

un  (f
0) 1()
n
2
2;n8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 

P
n2N n[unn (f 0) 1()]
PMn 1
m=1
Pm 1
s=0
266664
P
n2N nMn 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]
(1+r)
P
n2N nMn
"
unn (f 0) 1()+ 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
#
377775
s
P
n2N nMn
"
unn (f 0) 1()+ 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]
#
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
2
1 
24 Pn2N nMn 1 f 00[(f 0) 1()]P
n2N nMn

unn (f 0) 1()+ 1 
f 00[(f 0) 1()]

352
+o
 
2

;
(A.75)
where we denote by 2;n the common variance of n;m;t across m = 1; ::;Mn. Likewise, (A.65),
(A.67), and (A.72) imply that in a segmented market n with traded opportunities, the variance of
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the wealth of arbitrageurs is
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22nMn
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Combining (A.75) with (A.62) and (A.73), we nd that the variance of the spread associated
to a traded opportunity (n;m) under integration is
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(A.77)
Likewise, combining (A.76) with (A.66) and (A.74), we nd that the variance of the spread asso-
ciated to opportunity (n;m) under segmentation is
Var(n;m;t) =
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(A.78)
62
If unn   (f 0) 1() or ;n= are close to zero for n but are suciently large for n0 2 Nnfng, then
Var(n;m;t) is close to zero under segmentation but not under integration. Hence, Var(n;m;t) is
larger under integration.
B General Contracts
B.1 Contracts and Equilibrium
A contract ! that arbitrageurs can trade with i-investors in period t is characterized by (i) payments
!;t0 that the seller of the contract must make to the buyer in periods t
0 > t, (ii) a price q!;t that
the seller of the contract receives from the buyer in period t, and (iii) collateral that the seller of
the contract must post with the buyer. The payments !;t0 can depend on information available in
all markets including market i. We assume that payments are non-negative and are not all equal
to zero. No-arbitrage then implies that the price q!;t must be positive. Collateral must be in the
form of cash or other contracts. A contract ! can be traded in any period t 2 ft!; ::; t!  1g, where
t! occurs before the rst positive payment and t! is when the last positive payment is made. The
period t! can be innite, and if it is nite we set q!;t! = 0. We denote by 
i;t the set of contracts
that can be traded in market i and period t.
To specify how contracts can be collateralized using other contracts, we dene contracts recur-
sively. Contracts of level 1 are collateralized by the riskless asset. Contracts of level n + 1 are
collateralized by the riskless asset and by a nite number of contracts of levels 1 up to n. For
a contract ! 2 
i;t and period t, we denote by  !;t  0 the units of the riskless asset and by
 !;!0;t  0 the units of a lower-level contract !0 2 
i;t that are required as collateral. We also
denote by `(!; t) the level of the contract. The collateral amounts  !;t and  !;!0;t and the level
`(!; t) can depend on information available in all markets including market i.
We denote by y!;t the position of i-investors and x!;t the position of arbitrageurs in a contract
! 2 
i;t and period t. Because the number of contracts is innite, there is an innite set of positions.
We assume that only a nite number of the positions are non-zero.
The collateral that short positions require must be covered by long positions. Suppose, for
example, that arbitrageurs have a short position in a contract ! 2 
i;t, which requires contract
!0 2 
i;t as collateral. This does not necessarily imply that arbitrageurs must have an overall long
position in contract !0: they must buy contract !0 to post as collateral for the short position in
contract !, but they could undertake an additional transaction in contract !0 to establish an overall
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short position in that contract. We decompose the position x!0;t in contract !
0 into
x!0;t = x
c
!0;t + x^!0;t;
where xc!0;t  0 is collateral set aside for short positions in higher-level contracts ! 2 
i;t, and x^!0;t
is the remainder of the position, which can be negative. The collateral xc!0;t must satisfy
xc!0;t =
X
!2
i;t
`(!;t)>`(!0;t) and x^!;t<0
( x^!;t) !;!0;t: (B.1)
The collateral vi;t in the riskless asset required for contracts in market i must likewise satisfy
vi;t =
X
!2
i;t
x^!;t<0
( x^!;t) !;t: (B.2)
The wealth that arbitrageurs \tie up" in market i is
P
!2
i;t x!;tq!;t + vi;t, the value of their
positions in the contracts traded in market i and of the riskless collateral. The nancial constraint of
arbitrageurs requires that the sum of that quantity across markets does not exceed the arbitrageurs'
total wealth Wt:
Wt 
X
i2I
0@ X
!2
i;t
x!;tq!;t + vi;t
1A : (B.3)
As in Section 2.3.2, we assume that i-investors have enough wealth so that their nancial constraint
is never binding.
Investors and arbitrageurs can default on their short positions in the contracts. Defaulting
on a unit short position in a contract ! 2 
i;t in period t + 1 raises the wealth of an agent by
!;t+1 + q!;t+1 since the agent does not make the payment !;t+1 and no longer has the liability
q!;t+1. At the same time, the agent loses the collateral associated to the position. Default is costlier
to the agent than no default if
!;t+1 + q!;t+1  (1 + r) !;t +
X
!02
i;t
`(!;t)>`(!0;t)
 !;!0;t(!0;t+1 + q!0;t+1); (B.4)
i.e., the amount saved by not making the payment is smaller than the value of the collateral seized.
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Without loss of generality, we can assume that there is no default. This is because we can replace a
contract ! that involves default by one with the same collateral and with required payments equal
to the actual payments (including the eects of default) under !.
Under no default, the budget constraint of an i-investor is
wi;t+1 =
X
!2
i;t
y!;t(!;t+1 + q!;t+1) + (1 + r)
0@wi;t   X
!2
i;t
y!;tq!;t
1A+ ui;ti;t+1   ci;t+1; (B.5)
and of an arbitrageur is
Wt+1 =
X
i2I
X
!2
i;t
x!;t(!;t+1 + q!;t+1) + (1 + r)
0@Wt  X
i2I
X
!2
i;t
x!;tq!;t
1A  ct+1: (B.6)
Eqs. (B.5) and (B.6) are counterparts of (14) and (16), with the positions in the contracts replacing
those in the risky assets.
Denition 3. A competitive equilibrium with no default consists of prices q!;t for all contracts
! 2 
i;t, and positions in the contracts y!;t for the i-investors and x!;t for the arbitrageurs, such
that (B.4) holds, positions are optimal given prices, and the markets for all contracts clear:
iy!;t + x!;t = 0: (B.7)
B.2 Binomial Payos
We next assume that the variables i;t have a binomial distribution and the variables i;t are equal
to zero. Given symmetry, the binomial assumption implies that the variables
i;t
i
take the values 1
and -1 with probabilities one-half.
Proposition B.1. There exists a competitive equilibrium with no default such that the dynamics
of wealth of i-investors and arbitrageurs are as in Section 3.2 and the prices q!;t of all contracts
! 2 
i;t are given by
q!;t =
exp( Zi;t)Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 = i) + exp(Zi;t)Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 =  i)
(1 + r) [exp( Zi;t) + exp(Zi;t)] ; (B.8)
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where
Zi;t  A
+A
(yi;t + ui;t)i
and yi;t is as in Section 3.2.
Proof of Proposition B.1: We rst study optimization by i-investors. We proceed as in the
proof of Proposition 1, conjecture the value function (15) with A = r and Fi;t given by (A.21),
and use the budget constraint (B.5) instead of (14). Optimal consumption is given by
ci;t+1 =
A
h
(1 + r)wi;t +
P
!2
i;t y!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] + ui;ti;t+1
i
+ Fi;t+1 + log
 

A

+A
;
(B.9)
which is the counterpart of (A.15). Optimal positions in the contracts solve
max
y!;t
Et
8<:  exp
0@  A
+A
24(1 + r)wi;t + X
!2
i;t
y!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] + ui;ti;t+1
351A9=; ;
(B.10)
which is the counterpart of (A.16) after omitting terms that are known in period t. The rst-order
condition with respect to y!;t is
Et
8<:[!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t]
 exp
0@  A
+A
24 X
!2
i;t
y!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] + ui;ti;t+1
351A9=; = 0: (B.11)
Eq. (B.8) that characterizes equilibrium prices can be written as
Et

[!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] exp

  A
+A
(yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1

= 0: (B.12)
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Eqs. (B.11) and (B.12) imply that if positions in the contracts satisfy
X
!2
i;t
y!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] = yi;ti;t+1 + Gt; (B.13)
where Gt is known in period t, then they are optimal because the rst-order condition (B.11) is
met. Positions satisfying (B.13) are not unique, and we present one implementation at the end of
this proof. Eq. (B.13) implies that the dynamics of wealth of i-investors are the same as in Section
3.2. Indeed, multiplying (B.12) by y!;t and summing across ! 2 
i;t, we nd
Et
8<: X
!2
i;t
y!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] exp

  A
+A
(yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1
9=; = 0: (B.14)
Moreover, the maximization in (A.16) implies that
Et

yi;t (i;t + i;t+1) exp

  A
+A
(yi;t + ui;t)i;t+1

= 0: (B.15)
Substituting
P
!2
i;t y!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] from (B.13) into (B.14), and comparing with
(B.15), we nd Gt = i;t. Substituting Gt = i;t into (B.13), we nd that budget constraint (B.5)
of i-investors becomes identical to the budget constraint (14) in Section 3.2. Since the dynamics of
the wealth of i-investors are the same as in Section 3.2, the conjectured value function (15) satises
the Bellman equation.
We next study optimization by arbitrageurs. We proceed in two steps: in Step 1 we show that
the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth are deterministic, and in Step 2 that they are as in Section 3.2.
Step 1: To show deterministic dynamics, we show that if arbitrageurs choose in period t a
portfolio of contracts whose aggregate payo in period t + 1 is risky, then there exists another
portfolio that is riskless and has a return that is at least as high as the expected return of the
risky portfolio. We construct a \dominant" riskless portfolio for each market i separately, and then
aggregate across markets. From the budget constraint (B.6), the (excess) return that arbitrageurs
earn on their portfolio of contracts in market i is
X
!2
i;t
x!;t [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] : (B.16)
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Consider rst a market i without an endowment shock, i.e., ui;t = 0. Since Zi;t = 0, (B.8)
implies that
q!;t =
Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 = i) + Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 =  i)
2(1 + r)
=
Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1)
1 + r
;
and hence the expected return in (B.16) is zero. A dominant riskless portfolio is one with zero
positions.
Consider next a market i with an endowment shock. If the expected return in (B.16) is non-
positive, then a dominant riskless portfolio is one with zero positions. If the expected return in
(B.16) is positive, then we will construct a dominant riskless portfolio that involves positions in
markets i and  i. As an intermediate step in this construction, we show that the original risky
portfolio has the same expected return and ties up the same amount of arbitrageur wealth as a unit
long position in a single contract !^i that is traded in market i and has binary payos. The payos
of !^i are
Et
24 X
!2
i;t
x!;t (!;t+1 + q!;t+1)
 i;t+1 = i
35+ (1 + r)vi;t  Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t;
Et
24 X
!2
i;t
x!;t (!;t+1 + q!;t+1)
 i;t+1 =  i
35+ (1 + r)vi;t  Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t;
in period t+ 1 and states i;t+1 = i and i;t+1 =  i, respectively, and zero afterwards. The price
of !^i in period t is
exp( Zi;t)

Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t

+ exp(Zi;t)
h
Q
i;t+1
+ (1 + r)vi;t
i
(1 + r) [exp( Zi;t) + exp(Zi;t)]
=
X
!2
i;t
x!;t
exp( Zi;t)Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 = i) + exp(Zi;t)Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 =  i)
(1 + r) [exp( Zi;t) + exp(Zi;t)] + vi;t
=
X
!2
i;t
x!;tq!;t + vi;t
 Qi;t + vi;t;
where the rst step follows from (B.8), the second by using the denitions of (Qi;t+1; Qi;t+1) and
rearranging terms, and the third from (B.8). Therefore, the wealth Qi;t + vi;t that arbitrageurs tie
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up in market i is the same as under the original risky portfolio. The expected return from buying
!^i is
1
2

Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t

+
1
2
h
Q
i;t+1
+ (1 + r)vi;t
i
  (1 + r) (Qi;t + vi;t)
=
1
2

Qi;t+1 +Qi;t+1

  (1 + r)Qi;t
=
X
!2
i;t
x!;t

1
2
[Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 = i) + Et (!;t+1 + q!;t+1ji;t+1 =  i)]  (1 + r)q!;t

=
X
!2
i;t
x!;tEt [!;t+1 + q!;t+1   (1 + r)q!;t] ;
where the third step follows from the denitions of (Qi;t; Qi;t+1; Qi;t+1). The expected return from
buying !^i is thus the same as under the original risky portfolio. To complete the analysis of !^i, we
must show that it is a proper contract in the sense that its payos are non-negative. Multiplying
(B.4) by  x^!;t for those ! 2 
i;t for which x^!;t < 0, and summing across !, we ndX
!2
i;t
x^!;t<0
( x^!;t)(!;t+1 + q!;t+1)
 (1 + r)
X
!2
i;t
x^!;t<0
( x^!;t) !;t +
X
!2
i;t
x^!;t<0
X
!02
i;t
`(!;t)>`(!0;t)
( x^!;t) !;!0;t(!0;t+1 + q!0;t+1)
= (1 + r)vi;t +
X
!02
i;t
X
!2
i;t
`(!;t)>`(!0;t) and x^!;t<0
( x^!;t) !;!0;t(!0;t+1 + q!0;t+1)
= (1 + r)vi;t +
X
!02
i;t
xc!0;t(!0;t+1 + q!0;t+1); (B.17)
where the second step follows from (B.1) and the third from (B.2). Eq. (B.17) implies that
X
!2
i;t
( x^!;t)(!;t+1 + q!;t+1)  (1 + r)vi;t +
X
!2
i;t
xc!;t(!;t+1 + q!;t+1)
) (1 + r)vi;t +
X
!2
i;t
x!;t(!;t+1 + q!;t+1)  0: (B.18)
Taking expectations in (B.18) conditional on i;t+1 = i and i;t+1 =  i, we nd that Qi;t+1+(1+
r)vi;t and Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t, respectively, are non-negative.
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We next combine the unit long position in the contract !^i with a unit short position in a contract
!^ i that is traded in market  i, has the same payos as !^i, and is collateralized with v i;t units
of the riskless asset. The price of !^ i in period t is
exp( Z i;t)

Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t

+ exp(Z i;t)
h
Q
i;t+1
+ (1 + r)vi;t
i
(1 + r) [exp( Z i;t) + exp(Z i;t)]
=
exp(Zi;t)Qi;t+1 + exp( Zi;t)Qi;t+1
(1 + r) [exp(Zi;t) + exp(Zi;t)] + vi;t
=
Qi;t+1 +Qi;t+1
1 + r
 Qi;t + vi;t
 Q i;t + vi;t; (B.19)
where the rst step follows from (B.8), the second because Z i;t =  Zi;t, and the third from the
denition of Qi;t. The wealth that arbitrageurs tie up in market  i is
 (Q i;t + vi;t) + v i;t
and is equal to the wealth that they tie up in market i if
v i;t = Qi;t +Q i;t + 2vi;t: (B.20)
The expected return from shorting !^ i is
  1
2

Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t
  1
2
h
Q
i;t+1
+ (1 + r)vi;t
i
+ (1 + r) (Q i;t + vi;t)
=  1
2

Qi;t+1 +Qi;t+1

+ (1 + r)Q i;t
=
1
2

Qi;t+1 +Qi;t+1

  (1 + r)Qi;t;
where the third step follows from the denition of Q i;t. Therefore, the expected return of the
short position in !^ i is the same as that of the long position in !^i. To complete the analysis of
!^ i, we must show that arbitrageurs do not default on their short position. Eq. (B.4) implies that
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default does not occur if
maxfQi;t+1; Qi;t+1g+ (1 + r)vi;t  (1 + r)v i;t
, maxfQi;t+1; Qi;t+1g  (1 + r) (Qi;t +Q i;t + vi;t)
, maxfQi;t+1; Qi;t+1g  Qi;t+1 +Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vt; (B.21)
where the second step follows from (B.20) and the third from the denition of Q i;t. Eq. (B.21)
holds because the payos Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t and Qi;t+1 + (1 + r)vi;t of !^i are non-negative.
The riskless portfolio that dominates the original risky portfolio in market i consists of a half-
unit long position in !^i and a half-unit short position in !^ i. Since a unit long position in !^i and
a unit short position in !^ i each has the same expected return as the original risky portfolio, the
combination of two half-unit positions also has the same expected return. The same applies to the
amount of arbitrageur wealth that is tied up: it is the same under the combination of two half-unit
positions as under the original risky portfolio. Therefore, the arbitrageurs' nancial constraint is
still met. Finally, the portfolio is riskless because !^i and !^ i have the same payos.
Step 2: From Step 1, we can assume that the portfolio of arbitrageurs in period t is as follows:
(i) in each market i with ui;t > 0, arbitrageurs hold a long position in a contract with one-period
payos, (ii) in each market  i with ui;t < 0, arbitrageurs hold a short position of the same size as in
market i and in a contract with the same payos, (iii) the payos of the contracts in markets i and
 i are binary and contingent on i;t+1, (iv) the short position in market  i is collateralized with
an investment in the riskless asset such that the arbitrageur wealth tied up in market  i equals
that in market i, (v) in each market i with ui;t = 0, arbitrageurs hold a zero position.
Since the long position in the contract traded in each market i with ui;t > 0 must have positive
expected return, (B.8) implies that the contract must have larger payo when i;t+1 = i than when
i;t+1 =  i. Moreover, we can take the payo when i;t+1 =  i to be zero since the contract
price would then be lower, and hence arbitrageurs would be able to tie up less wealth in their long
position in market i. We normalize the payo when i;t+1 = i to 2i, and denote by !
0
i the contract
in market i and by !0 i the contract in market  i. We also denote by xi;t the number of units of
the long position in !0i and of the short position in !
0
 i, by qi;t the price of !
0
i, and by q i;t the price
of !0 i.
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The budget constraint (B.6) of arbitrageurs can be written as
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt + (1 + r)
X
i2At
xi;t(q i;t   qi;t)  ct+1
= (1 + r)Wt + 2
X
i2At
xi;t [i   (1 + r)qi;t]  ct+1; (B.22)
where the second step follows because the same calculations as in (B.19) imply that
q i;t =
2i
1 + r
  qi;t:
Since arbitrageurs must tie up wealth xi;tqi;t in each of markets i and  i, their nancial constraint
(B.3) becomes
Wt  2
X
i2At
xi;tqi;t: (B.23)
Eqs. (B.22) and (B.3) become identical to (27) and (32), respectively, by setting
i;t  i   (1 + r)qi;t:
Because of this equivalence, if the dynamics of i;t are as in Section 3.2, then arbitrageurs' optimal
positions xi;t and the dynamics of their wealth are also as in that section. Using (B.8) to substitute
for qi;t, we nd
i;t = i   2 exp( Zi;t)i
exp( Zi;t) + exp(Zi;t) = i
exp(Zi;t)  exp( Zi;t)
exp( Zi;t) + exp(Zi;t) :
This coincides with i;t given by (25) when i;t+1 has a binomial distribution. Therefore, ar-
bitrageurs' optimal positions xi;t and the dynamics of their wealth are the same as in Section
3.2. Eq. (B.13) implies that the optimal positions of i-investors are yi;t, as in Section 3.2. Since
iyi;t + xi;t = 0, markets clear.
An alternative implementation of the equilibrium derived in Proposition B.1 is through the
contracts assumed in Section 2. Two contracts are traded in market i. The rst is asset i, with
short positions in that contract being collateralized by the riskless asset. The second is a contract
with a riskless payo, with short positions in that contract being collateralized by asset i. The
rst contract is level 1, and the second is level 2. The collateral for each contract is the minimum
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required so that the no-default condition (B.4) is met. A short position of arbitrageurs in the rst
contract, combined with the required collateral, yields zero if t+1 = i and 2i if t+1 =  i. A
short position of arbitrageurs in the second contract, combined with the required collateral, yields
2i if t+1 = i and zero if t+1 =  i. The former is equivalent to the short position in !0 i, and
the latter is equivalent to the long position in !0i.
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